Why do Indonesian politicians promote<i>shari’a</i>laws? An analytic framework for Muslim-majority democracies

Pisani, Elizabeth; Buehler, Michael

doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1206453

Cited by 18 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…In the past, fashion was not recognised because all classes could access it, but since the bourgeoisie began practising fashion signs, it began to spread to the public. Signs that are present today are considered to be emancipatory in the social order (Baudrillard, 1976;Baudrillard, 1983;Noor, 2015;Sari & Riso, 2017;Pisani & Buehler, 2017).…”

Section: Majelis Taklim As a Tool For Hijrahmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Social media is media that is designed to spread messages through social interaction and is made with publication techniques that are very easily accessible and large-scale. The ability of electronic media enables designers of media setting agendas to create reality by using a production model that Jean Baudrillard calls a simulation, namely the creation of real models without origin or initial reality, this is what he calls Hyperreality (Piliang, 2003;Mahfud, 2013;Atwan, 2016;Shavit, 2014;Dewi, 2017;Pisani & Buehler, 2017).…”

Section: Simulacra-simulations and Hyperreality Spacementioning

confidence: 99%

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Simulacra in women’s majelis taklim based on Jean Baudrillard’s perspective

Srinarwati¹,

Pratiwi²,

Arimbi³

2020

Indonesian Journal of Communications Studies

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This research aimed to discover the meaning of the Majelis Taklim for upper-middle-class worshipers and how simulacra-simulation and hyperreality processes occur in the Salafi Majelis Taklim. This research was a qualitative descriptive study which explored data through participatory observation, in-depth interviews, and documentation. The data was analysed by Miles and Huberman’s analysis through three related sub-processes, namely data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. Jean Baudrillard’s simulation-simulacra theory was used as the primary research framework. The results of data analysis revealed that (1) Majelis Taklim became a mean of hijrah for the members. The hijrah referred here is the conversion from non-Salafi to a Salafi movement. It is an ideology that Muslims must return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Apostles to become more religious, increase social piety, and stay away from restrictions (usury, photos, polytheistic acts, etc.). (2) With media’s support, Majelis Taklim became a simulacrum for the simulation process, which ultimately led to hyperreality, especially signs consumption practices (fashion, worship groups). (3) Hyperreality occurred in religious life.

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Section: Majelis Taklim As a Tool For Hijrahmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Simulacra-simulations and Hyperreality Spacementioning

confidence: 99%

Simulacra in women’s majelis taklim based on Jean Baudrillard’s perspective

Srinarwati¹,

Pratiwi²,

Arimbi³

2020

Indonesian Journal of Communications Studies

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“…Nor are they isolated phenomena, as increasing numbers of regions have adopted Islamic regulations over the past decade. Today, approximately 442 local shari'a regulations are in force in Indonesia (Pisani and Buehler 2017).…”

Section: Alliances Between ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Islamic Authoritiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rising Islamism and the Struggle for Islamic Authority in Post-Reformasi Indonesia

Arifianto

2019

TRaNS

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The successful ‘Defending Islam’ rallies of 2016–2017 provide clear evidence that Islamism is on the rise in contemporary Indonesia. Mainstream Islamic authorities, including groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, are increasingly losing their authority to newer, more conservative Islamic preachers and groups. What explains this phenomenon – and what does it mean for the moderate perspectives that many predicted would dominate Islam in Indonesia in the post-Reformasi era?This article argues that three main mechanisms can explain the rise of Islamism in Indonesia: 1) the creation of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ in post-Reformasi Indonesia and the way in which this marketplace has contributed to the rise of Islamism and the breakdown of Islamic authority; 2) the ascent of new Islamic authority figures, who propagate their views using new methods, ranging from social media to campus da'wa organisations and community-based activities (majelis taklim); and 3) the growing influence of new Islamic groups and preachers, who are building alliances with established religious elites and politicians. Such alliances strengthen the influence of new Islamic authorities, while further marginalising religious minorities, such as Ahmadi and Shi'a Muslims.

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“…According to these principles, Indonesia is neither a secular state nor a theocracy. Most Indonesian Muslims believe that Indonesia is an Islamic state that already accommodates the core values of Islam through Pancasila (e.g., social justice, democracy, equity) rather than through formal Sharia rules (see Nakhleh, 2009;Pisani & Buehler, 2017). Nevertheless, some Muslims perceive Indonesia to be a moderate secular state (Burhani, 2013), a stance that is unsatisfactory for religious fundamentalists who believe there is a religious obligation to establish an Islamic political system (Osman, 2010a(Osman, , 2010b.…”

Section: The Indonesian Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Religious Fundamentalism in the Intersection of National and Religious Identities

Wibisono

Louis

Jetten

2019

Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology

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Indonesia has seen recent expansions of fundamentalist movements mobilising members in support a change to the current constitution. Against this background, two studies were conducted. In Study 1, we explored the intersection of religious and national identity among Indonesian Muslims quantitatively, and in Study 2, we qualitatively examined religious and national identification among members of moderate and fundamentalist religious organisations. Specifically, Study 1 (N = 178) assessed whether the association of religious and national identity was moderated by religious fundamentalism. Results showed that strength of religious identification was positively associated with strength of national identification for both those high and low in fundamentalism. Using structured interviews and focus group discussions, Study 2 (N = 35) examined the way that self-alignment with religious and national groups develops among activists of religious movements in Indonesia. We found that while more fundamentalist activists attached greater importance to their religious identity than to any other identity (e.g., national and ethnic), more moderate activists represented their religious and national identities as more integrated and compatible. We conclude that for Indonesian Muslims higher in religious fundamentalism, religious and national identities appear to be less integrated and this is consequential for the way in which collective agendas are pursued.

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Why do Indonesian politicians promoteshari’alaws? An analytic framework for Muslim-majority democracies

Cited by 18 publications

References 14 publications

Simulacra in women’s majelis taklim based on Jean Baudrillard’s perspective

Simulacra in women’s majelis taklim based on Jean Baudrillard’s perspective

Rising Islamism and the Struggle for Islamic Authority in Post-Reformasi Indonesia

The Role of Religious Fundamentalism in the Intersection of National and Religious Identities

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