Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-making and Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar

Abstract

In recent years Myanmar underwent drastic political changes. While many see these changes as first tentative steps towards democratization, we argue that the current political transformation is not a deliberate process of liberalization, but a survival strategy of the military regime. Using arguments of the 'new institutionalism' as a theoretical foundation, this article explores the hypothesis that the high degree of professionalization of the Burmese military creates the incentive to institutionalize power-sharing among the ruling elite. Our empirical analysis finds evidence for both a highly professionalized military and institutions that by securing the military's continuing dominance serve the purpose of institutionalizing military power-sharing. These results imply that further democratization is unlikely as it must be initiated from within the still dominating military itself.

Myanmar: Surveillance and the Turn from Authoritarianism?

“…They have, however, seriously undermined the legitimacy (international, traditional) of the military government, which might have accelerated the 'transition to disciplined democracy'" (Bünte 2011: 22). Croissant and Kamerling (2013) view the cohesiveness and high professionalism of Myanmar's armed forces as the key determinant in the reorganization of the country's political system that culminated in the new constitution and elections.…”

Introduction: Development Challenges in Myanmar: Political Development and Politics of Development Intertwined

“…There was, at the same time, great hope and great concern ahead of the national elections in Myanmar in 2015. Despite strong signals of liberalization, observers feared that they were merely witnessing a new strategy for the military to ensure its survival (Croissant and Kamerling 2013;Huang 2013). The entire liberalization process was a top-down affair, orchestrated and controlled by the military regime and implemented in a gradual manner (Slater 2014; Bächtold 2015; Egreteau 2016; Stokke and Myint Aung 2020, in this special issue).The government reform rhetoric had not changed its often violent repression of ethnic groups and disrespect for human rights in ethnic minority areas, such as Kachin State (Seng Maw Lahpai 2014).…”

“…The military, while no longer officially in power, still yields considerable influence over politics as well as over internal security. The Constitution ensures that 25 percent of the seats are reserved for members of the military (Croissant and Kamerling 2013) and, instead of civilian control over the army, there is a continued need for power sharing between the NLD and the military, invoking definitions of Myanmar as a "disciplined democracy" (Slater 2014; Jones 2014a; Huang 2017). The development and institutionalization of political parties and civil society organizations are also necessary for democratic development and consolidation.…”

Inside Myanmar's Turbulent Transformation

“…We also benefit from a rapidly growing academic and popular literature about what is happening in Myanmar. Early efforts to grapple with the complexities of this situation have usefully highlighted contradictions and many blind spots (Croissant and Kamerling ; Egreteau ; Bünte ). The loose academic consensus is that such a transformation defies ready simplification, with changes underway that go well beyond political reform, to include a vast array of other social, cultural, economic, strategic and discursive considerations.…”