Why Do People Flee? Revisiting Forced Migration in Post-Saddam Baghdad

Abstract

When faced with political violence, why do some people choose to leave their homes while others stay? This article looks for motivations, particularly socioeconomic factors, behind decisions to stay or go. Drawing on new survey data from post-Saddam Baghdad, it confirms the general axiom that violent conflicts cause people to flee. However, the results are inconclusive in terms of the effect of socioeconomic circumstances as a major push or pull factor. Patriotism does not have an impact on migration intentions, and optimism about Iraq's future does not suffice as a pull factor. Interestingly, people who intend to flee Iraq are better educated, contrary to the general far right media portrayal of refugees.

IDPs in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Intractable Return and Absence of Social Integration Policy

“…Consistent with other literature (Tuathail and O’Loughlin, 2009; Adelman and Barkan, 2011; Metivier, Stefanovic and Loizides, 2018; Ozaltin, Shakir and Loizides, 2019) that asserts that return to a location where one’s ethnic community constitutes the demographic majority is perceived to be safer and therefore more desired, MERI’s (2017a, p. 30) data show that return has been a more attractive option for Shi’a Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens than to ethnic and religious minorities such as Christians, Sunni Shabaks, Yazidis or Kakais. This finding has been confirmed by IOM’s survey (February 2019), which demonstrates that nearly all Shi’a Shabaks and Shi’a Turkmen (belonging to majority Shi’a communities) are planning to stay in their areas of return.…”

“…Massive population displacements, systematic or as a consequence of civic unrest, have been a common collective experience in the last fifty years of Iraqi history. A well‐documented policy of demographic engineering, with the aim of changing the demographic composition of ethnically diverse and economically strategic areas, has been implemented in many parts of the country (see, e.g., Ismail, 2005; Ismail, 2011; Anderson and Stansfield, 2009; Bengio, 2014; PAX for Peace, 2015, Ozaltin, Shakir and Loizides, 2019). The second part of displacement, which is the subject of this paper, in contrast to the systematic demographic change, is, for the most part, a consequence of the collapse of state control and widespread sectarian violence and organized crime, which swept the country in the aftermath of the 2003 war.…”

“…The overwhelming majority of the population are Kurds who have, alongside Arabs, Christians, Sabean Mandaeans, Turkmens, Yazidis, Kakais and Jews, populated the area for a long history. Due to the demographic restructuring policies of successive Iraqi governments, inaccuracy of population censuses and general politicization of ethnicity, entirely reliable figures about the population size of each community are hard to find (see, e.g., Ismail, 2005;Anderson and Stansfield, 2009;Ismail, 2011;Bengio, 2014;Ozaltin, Shakir and Loizides, 2019 (Riordan, 2016, p. 2).…”

“…Moreover, research (Metivier, Stefanovic and Loizides, 2018) has also referred to generational differences in return intensions: IDPs who are born or grown up in the displaced setting and, in consequence, have less memory and attachment to the original home occasionally demonstrated less enthusiasm about return. Furthermore, research (Ozaltin, Shakir and Loizides, 2019; IOM, 2019) demonstrates that more educated IDPs not only are less inclined to return, but also are more enthusiastic to migrate to other countries. It is also suggested (Stefanovic and Loizides, 2011; Metivier, Stefanovic and Loizides, 2018; RWG, 2018; IOM February, 2019) that return in many cases is a family and even a community decision.…”

“…Nevertheless, research on return has elucidated a range of other nuances, which make return further complicated. To begin with, research on Iraq and elsewhere (Tuathail and O’Loughlin, 2009; Adelman and Barkan, 2011; PAX for Peace, 2015; Metivier, Stefanovic and Loizides, 2018; Ozaltin, Shakir and Loizides, 2019; IOM, 2019) has pointed to the gap of return between ethnic minority and ethnic majority groups with the former to have demonstrated feeble inclination to return. Moreover, research (Metivier, Stefanovic and Loizides, 2018) has also referred to generational differences in return intensions: IDPs who are born or grown up in the displaced setting and, in consequence, have less memory and attachment to the original home occasionally demonstrated less enthusiasm about return.…”