Why do people persist in sea-level rise threatened coastal regions? Empirical evidence on risk aversion and place attachment

Steimanis, Ivo; Mayer, Mathias; Vollan, Björn

doi:10.1016/j.crm.2021.100377

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 96 publications

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“…Thus, by responding to climate hazards with collective in situ adaptation, communities could be committing to pathways that limit future adaptation options. In the long-term, people could lose their initial capacity to migrate and face the risk of becoming immobile (Koubi et al, 2022) or even displaced (Bell et al, 2021; Steimanis et al 2021). Similarly, collective recovery from a typhoon not only reduces financial pressure, but emotional support by family, friends, and neighbors reduces anxiety and worry about future events.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prosociality as response to slow- and fast-onset climate hazards

Steimanis

Vollan

2022

Glob. Sustain.

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Non-technical summary More and more people around the globe experience climate hazards. For vulnerable populations, these hazards not only cause significant physical damages, but can also affect the way people interact with each other. How such interactions are affected by climate hazards is particularly important for understanding the vulnerability of communities. Prosocial behavior is key for communities that heavily rely on informal social support to deal with these threats and for cooperative solutions to provide and maintain public goods. To investigate these effects, we talk to people living on the front lines of climate change and measure their prosociality using behavioral tasks. Our results show that both fast- and slow-onset hazards increase prosociality, underscoring the importance of well-functioning social relationships for dealing with hardship and uncertainty in a variety of contexts. Technical summary People's willingness to engage in prosocial behavior can affect how vulnerable and resilient populations are to climate hazards. We study how different types of climate hazards, fast-onsetting cyclones and slowly rising sea-levels, might affect peoples' prosociality using incentivized behavioral tasks. We sample people who are at the forefront of climate change and either experienced Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (study 1; n = 378) or are from sea-level rise hotspots (study 2; n = 1047) in Solomon Islands, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. We experimentally manipulate the salience of these hazards through recall or informational videos. Results from study 1 show that increases in prosociality are (i) independent of whether supportive behaviors or conflicts are recalled, (ii) are not only targeted to a narrow in-group, and (iii) do not come with increases in antisocial behaviors. In study 2, we also find that people behave more prosocial when they are informed about the impacts of rising sea-levels. Our survey evidence suggests that people who already perceive the threat of displacement due to rising sea-levels are also more prosocial. Overall, peoples' responses to both types of hazards are geared toward collective action, which could strengthen their adaptive capacity to deal with climate risks. Social media summary People severely affected by sea-level rise and rapidly emerging climate hazards are responding with increases in prosocial behaviors to fellow villagers.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prosociality as response to slow- and fast-onset climate hazards

Steimanis

Vollan

2022

Glob. Sustain.

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“…Evidence regarding the relationship between perceptions of weather‐related shocks, short‐term climatic variations, and longer‐term climate‐related changes and migration is somewhat mixed. Numerous studies show that perceived (self‐reported) impacts of climate‐related changes (such as more frequent weather shocks and short‐ or longer‐term changes in temperature or precipitation) can contribute to pressures, decisions, and intentions for migration (Afifi et al, 2016; Alam et al, 2017; Kabir et al, 2017; Koubi, Spilker, et al, 2016; Parsons & Nielsen, 2021; Steimanis et al, 2021; Warner & Afifi, 2014). There is some evidence that perceived climatic shocks (e.g., rainfall fluctuations) influence migration decisions even when not aligned with existing climatic data (de Longueville et al, 2020), indicating that perceptions alone can affect migration.…”

Section: Perceptions and Narrativesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate change and migration: A review and new framework for analysis

Daoust,

Selby

2024

WIREs Climate Change

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This article presents a new interpretive framework for understanding the implications of climate change for migration, and reviews and reflects on existing evidence and research gaps in light of this framework. Most existing climate‐migration research is heavily environment‐centric, even when acknowledging the importance of contextual or intervening factors. In contrast, the framework proposed here considers five different pathways through which climate change is affecting, or might affect, migration: short‐term shocks, long‐term climatic and related changes, environmental “pull” factors, climate adaptation and mitigation measures, and perceptions and narratives. In reviewing the existing evidence relating to each of these pathways, the paper finds among other things that short‐term shocks may simultaneously increase and reduce migration; that the evidence on long‐term trends provides a weak basis for understanding future dynamics; and that more attention needs to be paid to the other three pathways, by researchers and policymakers alike. Overall, the proposed framework and associated evidence review suggest a different and broader understanding of the migration implications of climate change from that outlined in the IPCC's most recent assessment, or in many existing reviews.This article is categorized under: Climate and Development Knowledge and Action in Development

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“…Overall, the interlinkages between push and pull factors of migration are highly complex and further recent studies reject the often portrayed mono-causal link and direction between climate change, environmental degradation, and migration. There is mounting evidence that people living in areas exposed to multiple climate hazards could be deprived of their capacity to migrate and could face displacement in the future (Bell et al 2021;Steimanis et al 2021). In this vein, Groth et al (2020) showed that rural households in Ethiopia face eroding capabilities due to climate hazards which increased inequalities in the ability to use migration as an adaptation strategy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

(Climate) Migrants welcome? Evidence from a survey experiment in Austria

2022

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We study how economic, conflict, and environmental drivers of migration influence immigration acceptance in a receiving country. We carried out an online survey experiment in autumn 2015 with 686 student participants from the University of Innsbruck in Austria. In the survey experiment, respondents state their acceptance for a fictitious migrant from Chad where we vary the following causes of the migration decision: (1) violent conflicts, (2) environmental degradation due to global climate change, (3) environmental degradation due to local overuse, and (4) better economic prospects. We find that respondents support migrants who move because of climate change as much as conflict migrants. Acceptance is lowest for migrants who decide to leave for economic reasons, while it is slightly higher in the case of environmental degradation due to local overuse. Strikingly, a sizable share of respondents (25%) would even reject conflict migrants. Respondents who perceive a negative correlation between welfare, crime rates and job opportunities, and the presence of immigrants display lower immigration acceptance for all motives underlying the migration decision. In addition, we find heterogeneous effects depending on the respondents’ gender and political affiliation. Respondents with right-wing party preferences disclose lower acceptance levels for all causes except conflict. Female respondents are more accepting of climate migrants and less of economic migrants than men. This paper informs the debate around the ongoing political and societal polarization in Europe and elsewhere on the acceptance of different types of migrants.

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Why do people persist in sea-level rise threatened coastal regions? Empirical evidence on risk aversion and place attachment

Cited by 9 publications

References 96 publications

Prosociality as response to slow- and fast-onset climate hazards

Prosociality as response to slow- and fast-onset climate hazards

Climate change and migration: A review and new framework for analysis

(Climate) Migrants welcome? Evidence from a survey experiment in Austria

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