Why do some goods bear higher taxes than others?

Osborne, Martin J.

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(84)90056-5

Cited by 15 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Agents make utility maximizing labor-leisure choices subject to a budget constraint ' I would like to thank Robert Aumann, Roy Gardner, Mordecai Kurz, Martin Osborne, Hugo Sonnenschein, and Padmanabhan Srinagesh for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Our example is in keeping with the earlier results of Gardner [6] and Osborne [8] who have demonstrated that other well motivated changes in the Aumann and Kurz framework may also result in tax rates of less than 50 per cent. Of course, all errors remain my responsibility.…”

Section: Introduction In a Pioneering Set Of Articles [2 3 4] Aumansupporting

confidence: 90%

Power and Linear Income Taxes: An Example

Peck¹

1986

Econometrica

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Sun, This paper amends the Aumann and Kurz single commodity "Power and Taxes" model in several ways: A linear production technology is assumed, incentive effects are introduced, and tax schedules are restricted to be linear. A theorem is stated which characterizes the linear tax schedules which are the NTU solutions of the model. The solutions of an example are computed, providing a perspective on a result of the Aumann and Kurz model that equilibrium marginal tax rates are not less than 50 per cent. For this example, equilibrium marginal tax rates are less than 50 per cent; incentive effects appear to be responsible for the low tax rates.

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Section: Introduction In a Pioneering Set Of Articles [2 3 4] Aumansupporting

confidence: 90%

Power and Linear Income Taxes: An Example

Peck¹

1986

Econometrica

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“…Carter failed to achieve his objectives; Reagan succeeded. From a formal perspective, Aumann and Kurz (1977) present a cooperative game solution to the tax-transfer problem; see also Gardner (1981) Osborne (1984, and Peck (1986).…”

Section: Public Borrowingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy

Ingberman¹,

Inman²

1987

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If there has been a dominant trend in the evolution of the modern industrial societies of this century it has been the growing importance of government in the allocation of social resources. It is important that we appreciate the fundamentally political nature of the formation of government economic policy. This survey reviews and assesses our present understanding of how the political system might shape a nation's fiscal policy. Our approach is eclectic, drawing both from economics and political science, and decidedly micro-analytic in its orientation. From economics we adopt the perspective of utility maximizing agents and the analytics of trade, agreement, and market failure. From political science we learn just how and when these individual agents might act collectively to provide public goods, redistribute income, or issue government debt. Together the micro-analytics of economics and political science form the core theory of the 'new' political economy and provide a framework for understanding the emergence, and the performance, of governments. There is no more important test for the new discipline than providing a compelling explanation for the formation of fiscal policy in democratic societies.

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“…*Other interesting variants of the Aumann-Kurz model are presented in Gardner (1981Gardner ( , 1984) and Osborne (1979Osborne ( , 1984. Aumann, Kurz and Neyman (1983) apply the Aumann-Kurz framework to the provision of public goods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foundations in Microeconomic Theory

Jackson¹,

McLennan²

2008

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Why do some goods bear higher taxes than others?

Cited by 15 publications

References 7 publications

Power and Linear Income Taxes: An Example

Power and Linear Income Taxes: An Example

The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy

Foundations in Microeconomic Theory

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