Why do states rely on nuclear weapons? The case of Russia and beyond

Sokov, Nikolai

doi:10.1080/10736700208436895

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…This pledge represents the cornerstone of Chinese nuclear restraint claims. Other nuclear weapon states have promoted NFU: USSR/Russia maintained NFU from 1982 to 1993, 65 India has a conditional pledge since 2003, 66 States and the United Kingdom (as well as a reluctant France). A NFU treaty thus seems incompatible with a world in which extended nuclear commitments exist.…”

Section: Chinese Conformity With the Global Nuclear Ordermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This pledge represents the cornerstone of Chinese nuclear restraint claims. Other nuclear weapon states have promoted NFU: USSR/Russia maintained a NFU pledge from 1982 to 1993, 62 India has a conditional pledge since 2003, 63 and North Korea reportedly supports NFU. Yet China is the only nuclear weapon state to have maintained an unconditional NFU pledge since testing a nuclear weapon in 1964.…”

Section: Chinese Innovation In the Global Nuclear Ordermentioning

confidence: 99%

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Between conformity and innovation: China’s and India’s quest for status as responsible nuclear powers

Leveringhaus¹,

Estrada

2018

Rev. Int. Stud.

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China and India, as rising powers, have been proactive in seeking status as nuclear responsibles. Since the 1990s they have sought to demonstrate conformity with intersubjectively accepted understandings of nuclear responsibility within the global nuclear order, and have also sought recognition on the basis of particularistic practices of nuclear restraint. This article addresses two puzzles. First, nuclear restraint is at the centre of the pursuit of global nuclear order, so why have China and India not received recognition from influential members of the nuclear order for the full spectrum of their restraint-based behaviours? Second, why do China and India nonetheless persist with these behaviours? We argue that the conferral of status as a nuclear responsible is a politicised process shaped by the interests, values, and perceptions of powerful stakeholder states in the global nuclear order. China’s and India’s innovations are not incorporated into the currently accepted set of responsible nuclear behaviours because, indirectly, they pose a strategic, political, and social challenge to these states. However, China’s and India’s innovations are significant as an insight into their identity-projection and preferred social roles as distinctive rising powers, and as a means of introducing new, if nascent, ideas into non-proliferation practice and governance.

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Section: Chinese Conformity With the Global Nuclear Ordermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Chinese Innovation In the Global Nuclear Ordermentioning

confidence: 99%