Why do they want American Nukes? Central and Eastern European positions regarding US nonstrategic nuclear weapons

Horovitz, Liviu

doi:10.1080/09662839.2013.846326

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…5. The same fear was held by Central European allies after joining NATO, which led them to seek an American nuclear umbrella (see Horovitz, 2014). 6.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

German views on US nuclear weapons in Europe: public and elite perspectives

Onderčo

Smetana

2021

European Security

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Stationing of US nuclear weapons in Europe is a pillar of NATO deterrence. Despite their growing contestation, scholarly research on contemporary attitudes of both voters and political elites to the continued stationing of these weapons on their soil is lacking. We conducted original surveys of 2020 Germans and of 101 Bundestag members. Our results show scepticism about the military utility of US nuclear weapons in Germany, and aversion towards their use. At the same time, the results show a sizable support among both politicians and citizens for their removal from German territory as part of new nuclear arms control initiatives.

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“…5. The same fear was held by Central European allies after joining NATO, which led them to seek an American nuclear umbrella (see Horovitz, 2014). 6.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

German views on US nuclear weapons in Europe: public and elite perspectives

Onderčo

Smetana

2021

European Security

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“…During the Cold War, the American and Soviet superpowers used bribes and threats to coerce other, non-nuclear states to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 11 and their allies have used non-proliferation as a tool to gain concessions (side-payments) from the US and the USSR. 12 Even research on contemporary political issues shows that such geostrategic ties matter-Central European allies of the United States have been leveraging the tie against the United States 13 and, similarly, US allies have been shown more likely to promote coercive policies towards Iran that are much the same as those of the United States. 14 Yet, the PSI includes participants from 105 countries, of which around only one-third live under the US nuclear umbrella, or enjoy an alliance with the United States.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why is the Proliferation Security Initiative a Problematic Solution?: Table 1.

Onderčo

Hooft

2016

Chinese Journal of International Politics

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Informal institutions such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) have increasingly been at the forefront of global efforts to counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yet a number of countries with strong non-proliferation credentials and incentives to stop likely proliferators have hesitated to join it. We use insights from alliance theory to explain this counterintuitive situation, and frame the decisions of states that are considering joining the PSI as maximizing between security, autonomy, and influence. We argue that while the PSI and similar institutions are comparatively flexible and less rigid in nature, they also exert a lesser constraint on the more powerful states than do international organizations (IO) which reduce uncertainty by freezing the existing hierarchies in place. We then look at a collection of states that vary in their positions on American hegemony, and find that security interests are predominantly decisive among hegemonic and supporter states and nuclear capable states, which are in favour of supporting the PSI, while counter-hegemonic motivations are largely decisive among states that reject the PSI. Consequently, the perceived lack of legitimacy of informal frameworks by states that are sceptical of US hegemony not only undermines the long-term effectiveness of such frameworks, but also reinforces scepticism of US hegemony. The desirability of increasing informalization of security arrangements should therefore be reappraised in the light of systemic stability.

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“…While strategic weapons are more significant tools of deterrence and coercion, NSNWs have a key role to play as well, and, in the United States especially, with its large conventional superiority, their role can be overlooked or underappreciated. Nevertheless, this situation has changed significantly in the last few years with the appearance of major scholarship debating and questioning their usefulness especially with regard to formulation of doctrinal documents within NATO such as its Strategic Concept and the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (Larsen 2006, Yost 2009, Chalmers and Lunn 2010, Chalmers and Somerville 2011, Nichols et al 2012, Foradori 2013, Horowitz 2013.…”

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confidence: 98%