Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?

König, Thomas; Junge, Dirk

doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_8

Cited by 21 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…This logrolling logic is, in our view, one of the reasons as to why a 'culture of consensus' (Heisenberg, 2005) supposedly governs Council interactions (Schneider, 2008). 2 For example, Aksoy (2012), but also König and Junge (2009), show that states trade votes frequently in the Council, especially in the presence of qualified majority hurdles and multidimensional decision-making spaces. Finally, when a proposal reaches the final voting stage, the President of the Council has ensured that a majority of the Member States support it.…”

Section: The Political Economy Of Council Decision-makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Money Makes theEUGo Round: The Objective Foundations of Conflict in theCouncil ofMinisters

Bailer

Mattila

Schneider

2014

J of Common Market Studies

128

119

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Many examinations of the dimensions of conflict in the European Union Council of Ministers focus on the ideological roots of contestation in the EU. This article examines the extent to which structural attributes of the Member States explain the conflict within the Council of Ministers in general as well as in selected policy domains (agriculture, fisheries, environment, economic affairs). Drawing on the political economy literature of legislative decision‐making, a multilevel analysis shows that country‐level redistributive interests shape the interactions considerably and in some of the policy domains that are examined in more detail. The impact of ideological variables like the left‐right positioning of the Member State governments remains inconsistent and marginal in this analysis.

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Section: The Political Economy Of Council Decision-makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Money Makes theEUGo Round: The Objective Foundations of Conflict in theCouncil ofMinisters

Bailer

Mattila

Schneider

2014

J of Common Market Studies

128

119

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“…Creating package deals and negotiating side-payments is a time-consuming process, with more actors negotiating a broad range of issues in different dimensions (see also Ko¨nig and Junge, 2009;Selck, 2005). Similarly, it can be argued that forming coalitions in larger communities demands more information-processing.…”

Section: Theorizing Group Size and Decision-making Speedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Too big to run? Analysing the impact of enlargement on the speed of EU decision-making

Hertz

Leuffen

2011

European Union Politics

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The article analyses how enlargements affect the speed of European Union (EU) decision-making. In line with rationalist theories of group choice, we argue that enlargements increase the costs of organizing decisions, i.e. transaction costs. Increasing transaction costs, in turn, slow down EU law-making. We test this theory by estimating Cox regression models that incorporate time-varying covariates on all directives, regulations and decisions submitted by the European Commission between 1976 and 2006. In contrast to previous analyses, we show that an increase in group size indeed slows down EU law-making.

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“…This reduces the ability of EU members to pursue more integrationist policies. While pro-integrationist EU members could ameliorate this situation by, for example, providing side payments for anti-integrationist EU members, these side payments become increasingly costly as the number and heterogeneity of veto players increases (König and Junge 2009;Moravcsik 1991;Selck 2005). Since EU members have to accept policies that are further away from their ideal point, or are able to achieve their ideal policies only through increasingly costly measures, incentives to contribute to European collective goods should decrease as well.…”

Section: Domestic Politics and The Widening -Deepening Trade-offmentioning

confidence: 99%

Domestic politics and the widening–deepening trade-off in the European Union

Schneider¹

2014

Journal of European Public Policy

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This contribution analyzes the relationship between European Union (EU) enlargement, preference heterogeneity of EU members and co-operation in the EU. I argue that the widening of the EU does not invariably present an obstacle to cooperation. Preference heterogeneity in the Council is not only affected by the accession of new member states, but it also fluctuates over time owing to changes in the domestic political arena. In European countries, governmental coalitions have changed frequently, with important consequences for the ability of EU members to negotiate deeper integration. To test the theoretical hypotheses, I analyze to what extent the changing bargaining dynamics in the Council owing to domestic political circumstances, as compared to the accession of new member states itself, have affected the co-operation between EU member states over time.

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Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?

Cited by 21 publications

References 48 publications

Money Makes theEUGo Round: The Objective Foundations of Conflict in theCouncil ofMinisters

Money Makes theEUGo Round: The Objective Foundations of Conflict in theCouncil ofMinisters

Too big to run? Analysing the impact of enlargement on the speed of EU decision-making

Domestic politics and the widening–deepening trade-off in the European Union

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