This article aims to explore the extent to which, if at all, certain aspects of the abortion debate will be impacted by technologies that will allow one to remove a previable fetus from the body of a pregnant person, and gestate the fetus using an artificial support system. 1 In this article, I refer to this technology as partial ectogestation (Kingma & Finn, 2020). Though partial ectogestation is not currently available, at some point in the future it is possible that it will be perfected, and widely used. If so, it might be wondered whether, in those future circumstances, ending one's unwanted pregnancy through abortion will be unjust. It might also be wondered whether one will have a right to abortion in those circumstances, and, even if one has a right to abortion, ought one, nonetheless, end the pregnancy through transfer to an artificial support system. 2 These issues are not new. Several philosophers have noted, for example, that on some defenses of abortion, such as Judith Jarvis Thomson's (Thomson, 1971), a distinction must be drawn between defending the permissibility of abortion, and arguing for the right to the death of the fetus. Though Thomson does the first, in so doing, she is not thereby committed to the second. Indeed, it is widely thought that she rejects the second (