Why farm households have differences in corruption experiences? Evidences from Bangladesh

Abstract

Th e article explores the household-level determinants of corruption and its diff erent forms in Bangladesh. It also identifi es the micro-level factors for which households pay diff erent amount of bribe. To attain these objectives, experiences of 210 Bangladeshi farm households belonging to six diff erent districts of the country are analyzed. Th e econometric analyses show that the households with higher expenditure are more likely to face corruption and bribery, and also pay a higher amount of bribe. However, these households are less likely to face the negligence of duty and nepotism or favouritism. Such diff erences in the impact of the expenditure variable can be argued to be the outcome of a situation where corruption is pervasive and the offi cials have the bribe maximizing objective. Relationships with diff erent power entities reduce the households' probability to face corruption and its diff erent forms, and can avoid a higher bribe payment. Th e results argue for several policy actions for combating corruption in the country.

Factors that influence the competitiveness of Czech rural SMEs

“…On the other hand, belonging to the cluster plays a positive role (which is in accord with similar findings from other countries -see e.g. Anim-Somuah 2011; Anik et al 2013;or Janda et al 2013). Small firms in the clusters dominated over those that were not aware of the advantages that clusters provide, especially in the terms of synergy.…”

“…According to our knowledge, this is the fi rst empirical study of the determinants of competitiveness and innovations of the rural food processing enterprises in any of the European post-socialist countries. Our research therefore fi lls in the gap in the prevailing literature dealing predominantly either with the trade with agricultural products (Bielik et al 2013), or the fi rst world or the third world (Schreiner and Woller 2003;or Anik et al 2013).…”

Governing spillovers of agricultural land use through voluntary sustainability standards: A coverage analysis of sustainability requirements

“…Farm-related activities involving incoming or outgoing illicit financial flows such as bribery payments, e.g., to/from politicians or business partners, or tax evasion. (Anik et al, 2013;Fink, 2002) ☑ characteristics of the standards, which we complemented with additional coding based on consultations of VSS documents and the websites of the respective standard-setting organizations.…”

Household Income and Relationships with Different Power Entities as Determinants of Corruption

“…These factors include income, education, location, gender, marital status, profession, attitude and perception towards corruption, trust network, city size, etc. (Anik, Bauer, & Alam, 2013;Čábelková & Hanousek, 2004;Herrera, Razafindrakoto, & Rouband, 2007;Hunt, 2004;Mocan, 2008;Shaw, 2009;Swamy et al, 2001;Torgler & Valev, 2006) across households based on differences in socio-economic characteristics, assuming that a specific type of household is equally vulnerable to corruption in all sectors may be inappropriate. Furthermore, household level characteristics may influence households' probability of experiencing a particular form of corruption (Anik et al, 2013), and a particular service may be more prone to a specific form of corruption.…”

“…These factors include income, education, location, gender, marital status, profession, attitude and perception towards corruption, trust network, city size, etc. (Anik, Bauer, & Alam, 2013;Čábelková & Hanousek, 2004; Herrera, Razafindrakoto, & Rouband, 2007;Hunt, 2004;Mocan, 2008;Shaw, 2009;Swamy et al, 2001;Torgler & Valev, 2006 …”