The Nobel prize winning economist Elinor Ostrom once warned against 'the danger of self-evident truths' and suggested that 'the fact that something is widely believed does not make it correct ' (2000, p.33). The role of the social and political scientist was, for Ostrom, not simply to examine and explore a specific topic, event or theme but also to be constantly aware of the need to step back and question, challenge and disrupt the dominant lens through which the object of analysis is generally conceived. This article injects Ostrom's provocative plea into the sphere of British politics in order to question the 'self-evident truth' that GE2019 was 'a Brexit election'. The 'danger' of accepting this interpretation is that it is arguably too obvious, too simple, too cosmetic. It risks over-emphasising the visible machinations of recent events while at the same time under-emphasising and failing to expose the deeper socio-political roots, tensions and drivers that manifested themselves in GE2019. Put slightly differently, to accept GE2019 as a Brexit election is to focus on the tip of the iceberg while the aim of this article is to look beneath the (political) waterline. As such, the central argument of this chapter is that GE2019 was not a Brexit election but a disaffection election. This is an argument that demands a little unpacking. To some extent GE2019 was very clearly 'a Brexit election' for the simple reason that '[f]or most voters, how they cast their ballot in 2019 reflected where they stood in the Brexit debate' (Curtice, 2000, p.12). As such, the election proved an effective way of breaking the legislative deadlock that had emerged at Westminster and the contextual relevance of Brexit cannot be overlooked. And yet, stepping-back (qua. Ostrom) it is possible to question this 'selfevident truth' from at least two perspectives. First, as the work of David Cutts and his colleagues (2020) has demonstrated the outcome of GE2019 was shaped by a variety of long-term factors concerning shifts in the sources of support for the main parties, most of which pre-date Brexit. When viewed from a historical perspective -and as Andrew Gamble has emphasised (2019) -Boris Johnson's need to attract working class voters in Northern English towns was hardly a new challenge for the party, even