Why “Go Public”? Presidential Use of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Abstract

In recent years, presidents have utilized public appeals on behalf of their nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals with increasing regularity. In this study, I examine the timing, audience, and themes of these presidential speeches from 1977 to 2004. I find that presidents have tended to discuss circuit court nominees who are vulnerable to defeat in the confirmation process before narrow audiences consisting of sympathetic groups or campaign supporters. Presidents discussed nominees in an effort to influence Senate behavior, but more so to court favor with like‐minded groups and link nominees to electoral politics. These findings indicate that presidents have begun to insert their nominees into public political discourse for their own political gain, rather than to help their nominees secure confirmation.

The Law: Going Outside of the Family: Toward a Greater Understanding of Presidents’ Pursuit of Their Agendas Through Cross‐Party Federal Court Nominations

“…Presidents often use judicial nominations as a means of enhancing their electoral appeal, as evidenced by the fact that they tout these nominations in their election campaigns (Brownstein 2005; Zingerle 2018) and speak about them in order to mobilize elite support (Holmes 2008). Presidents also use cross‐partisan appeals as a strategy to enhance their popularity (Babington 2010; Loven 2009; Niquette 2018).…”

Going Public When Opinion Is Contested: Evidence from Presidents' Campaigns for Supreme Court Nominees, 1930‐2009

“…Holmes (2007, 2008) investigates going public over nominees to the U.S. courts of appeals from 1977 to 2005. In general, presidents did not go public over these nominees (presidents remained silent for 89% of the nominees studied).…”

“…We discuss the principal study, Johnson and Roberts (2004), below. However, useful comparisons come from work examining going public on lower court nominations (Holmes 2007, 2008) and work examining interest group activity during nominations (Scherer 2005); for broader comparisons across types of nominations, see Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998. More generally, we know of no other work that contrasts the predictions of political capital theory and opinion contest theory and applies them systematically to data from a single frequently recurring policy event.…”

Presidential Appointments and Public Trust

“… There is a large body of research examining how presidents go public on behalf of judicial nominees in order to shore up support ( e.g ., Cameron and Park ; Holmes ; Holmes ; Johnson and Roberts ; Johnson and Roberts ), as well as interest group activity ( e.g ., Scherer ; Vining ), but to date little published work has examined how nominations of any sort actually shape public opinion, though see Caldeira and Smith ().…”