2006
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.890829
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Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?

Abstract: This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model determines the level of CEO pay across firms and over time, offering a benchmark for calibratable corporate finance. The sixfold increase of CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to the six-fold increase i… Show more

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Cited by 480 publications
(702 citation statements)
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References 101 publications
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“…To assess financial regulation in the light of bankers’ pay, I offer a model of a competitive labor market by banks for teams of bankers. This endeavor builds on the seminal contributions of Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009). In these papers, the authors offer a model of a competitive labor market for CEOs.…”
Section: Calibration Of the Impact Of Remuneration On Bank Default Riskmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…To assess financial regulation in the light of bankers’ pay, I offer a model of a competitive labor market by banks for teams of bankers. This endeavor builds on the seminal contributions of Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009). In these papers, the authors offer a model of a competitive labor market for CEOs.…”
Section: Calibration Of the Impact Of Remuneration On Bank Default Riskmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, the relevant probability will lie in the left tail of Fn. I now follow Gabaix and Landier (2008) and use insights from extreme value theory. I assume that the density f is regular as it approaches zero so that the following limit, which describes the tail behavior, exists and is finite: limx0xf(x)/F(x)=γ(0,). Reflecting in the origin, it follows that the right‐hand tail of the distribution function F(x) is in the domain of attraction of the right‐hand tail of the Weibull class of distributions.…”
Section: The Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Jensen and Murphy, 1990) is that increased executive compensation can be an efficient consequence of an attempt to align top management salaries with those of shareholders. Gabaix and Landier (2008) emphasize the role of increasing firm size in explaining the increase in executive compensation, although Lemieux (2008, fn5) points out that the finding is sensitive to specification, and Gordon and Dew‐Becker (2008) argue that it is sensitive to measures of firm size and choice of time period. A very different possibility is that of Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002 and Bebchuk and Fried, 2004 who argue that higher CEO salaries are largely a result of the CEO's co‐opting corporate governance by influencing the choice of company directors.…”
Section: Potential Explanations For the Surge10mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…changes in the distribution of tasks, but also through changes in the productivity of worker–task pairs over time . For instance, Gabaix and Landier () and Terviö () exploit this unique feature of assignment models to explain (the rise in) CEO pay differentials. Both studies conclude that the distribution of managerial talent is in fact not very dispersed and that the bulk of (the rise in) CEO pay differentials is due to firms characteristics, i.e.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%