Why Hassan Rouhani Won Iran's 2013 Presidential Election

Sherrill, Clifton W.

doi:10.1111/mepo.12071

Cited by 16 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 1 publication

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In 2013, Rouhani was elected as president. His candidacy represents the Islamic Republic’s desire to reassert its legitimacy following the unpopularity of Ahmadinejad among many Iranians and the 2009–2010 uprisings (Holliday, 2016), intra-regime political battles (Sherrill, 2014: 70), a deteriorating economic situation due to Ahmadinejad’s economic policy and sanctions (Menashri, 2013: 8) and a desire to come out of isolation both within the regime and among many Iranians (Ehteshami and Zaccara, 2013: 7). Rouhani was supported by Khatami.…”

Section: The Discursive Construction Of Israel and Global Order Throumentioning

confidence: 99%

Populism, the International and Methodological Nationalism: Global Order and the Iran–Israel Nexus

Holliday

2019

Political Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article contends that the international is integral to populism. Thus, it calls for populism scholarship to embrace the interconnectivity between the domestic/internal and international/external. By borrowing from Global Historical Sociology, Global International Relations and Ernesto Laclau’s notion of populist discourse, the article puts forward a new conceptual framework for the study of populism that bridges the gap between Comparative Politics and International Relations. It shows how populist discourse simultaneously constructs several aspects of the social world: the actor who is articulating it and its relationship with its own population, that actor’s relationship with others in the international system, and global order. To illustrate its case, it examines populist discourses of Islamic Republic of Iran elites. Their discourses articulate the need to maintain the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy and populist credentials inside and outside Iran, delegitimise Israel, and construct global order. These discourses are grounded in a historical trajectory: the 1979 Revolution.

show abstract

Section: The Discursive Construction Of Israel and Global Order Throumentioning

confidence: 99%

Populism, the International and Methodological Nationalism: Global Order and the Iran–Israel Nexus

Holliday

2019

Political Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…On June 14, 2013, the Iranian people were called to elect a new President among eight candidates, previously confirmed by the Guardian Council (Sherrill 2014). Given the legal limitation to two consecutive terms and the isolation within the Iranian political system, outcoming President Ahmadinejad was not standing for re-election.…”

Section: The Wind Of Changementioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Nuclear Ambiguity

Gerli

2019

Premio Cesare Alfieri «Cum Laude»

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The objective of the thesis was to illustrate the trajectory of Iranian nuclear crisis from the origins of the nuclear program to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly referred as the nuclear deal. The guiding thread was the concept of “nuclear ambiguity”, which was addressed in the following terms: the civilian-military application of the atom constituted the primary source and was further exacerbated by several loopholes in the non-proliferation regime; Teheran exploited both sources and developed a large program with possible military dimensions. The JCPOA attempted to break this trend by limiting Iran’s program only to peaceful goals and by creating an unprecedented inspection mechanism. In other words, it attempted to go beyond the previous history of ambiguity.

show abstract

“…These new sanctions greatly impacted Iran's economy. Manufacturing declined, unemployment skyrocketed, and social issues such as drug use began to spiral out of control, leaving Iranian society in an increasingly precarious state (Sherrill, ).…”

Section: Historical Analysis Of Iran's Risementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, the Ayatollahs understood, that with all his rhetoric and populist policies and image, Ahmadinejad became a liability rather than an asset in enhancing Iran's regime stability. They therefore persuaded him not seek an additional term as president (Saikal, :71, 87; Sherrill, ).…”

Section: Historical Analysis Of Iran's Risementioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptions and Misperceptions of Regime Stability and Iran's Convoluted Rise to Regional Influence

Arsenault

Honig

2017

Digest Mid East Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article seeks to explain revolutionary Iran's convoluted rise to regional prominence over the last three decades. We hold that perceptions and misperceptions of regime stability (both of one's self and of others) by the relevant actors have played a major role in Iran's recent. The main logic is that the success of many strategies employed by relevant regional actors to augment their regional influence (both Iran seeking more influence and others seeking to stem that influence) have crucially hinged on making correct assessments of regime stability. This study has both theoretical and empirical findings. Theoretically, we find that failures to accurately estimate regime stability stem from three main sources: (1) objective uncertainties regarding the target state's level of regime stability, given the high strength of societal forces shaping state-society relations in the Middle East and given the distinct variation between autocrats in terms of their ability to develop effective counterrevolutionary/repressive tools; (2) ideological blinders, from which both the United States and regional actors frequently suffer, which have often led them to be falsely optimistic regarding the existence of either subversive opportunities or opportunities to stabilize regimes facing domestic pressures; and (3) incorrect theories regarding sources of regime stability which lead experts and policymakers to overlook factors which may destabilize a regime. This article has two major empirical findings. First, Iran's rise may be at least partly attributed to Iran demonstrating a slightly better learning curve at the tactical level (i.e., learning subversive skills from its Lebanese experience in the 1980s-1990s and applying them to Iraq in the 2000s-2010s) as well as at the strategic level (i.e., understanding the limits of its subversive capacities and correctly assessing when it can engage in successful stabilizing operations). Second, two errors committed by the United States have been far more consequential than those committed by Iran for the regional balance of power: First, the George W. Bush Administration myopically opened up subversive opportunities for

show abstract

Why Hassan Rouhani Won Iran's 2013 Presidential Election

Cited by 16 publications

References 1 publication

Populism, the International and Methodological Nationalism: Global Order and the Iran–Israel Nexus

Populism, the International and Methodological Nationalism: Global Order and the Iran–Israel Nexus

Beyond Nuclear Ambiguity

Perceptions and Misperceptions of Regime Stability and Iran's Convoluted Rise to Regional Influence

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About