Why is there no wind rush in France?

Abstract

In France, an ambitious programme to expand electricity from renewables was outlined in the year 2000 Electricity Bill and led to the establishment of a feed-in tariff guaranteeing kilowatt hour prices to targeted suppliers. Because this support mechanism was a major cause of the dramatic expansion of wind power in Denmark, Germany and Spain, it was expected to have similar consequences in France. However, the pace of expansion proved moderate over 2000-5, with some acceleration since. This article explains these outcomes by reference to three factors: (1) the infl uence of institutional frameworks, (2) the impact of industry structures and (3) the role of mobilising discourses. Finally, it surveys policy reforms in 2005-7 to accelerate deployment. Noting that France's 2010 target of 21% of electricity generation from renewables is unlikely to be met, the article concludes that policy makers need to look beyond the mere choice of policy instrument (such as a feed-in tariff). Its main fi nding is that the impact of a policy instrument is heavily infl uenced not just by its settings (in this context, the level of economic incentive offered to market actors) but also by the institutional and industrial contexts of usage and by the relevance of mobilising discourses.

Wind power planning in France (Aveyron), from state regulation to local planning

“…While it is true that the lock-in into nuclear energy does not provide the central government with incentives to guide wind power development (Szarka, 2007), the institutionalization of revenue sharing with local communities through taxes has undermined the power of local opposition. It is not inexistent, but it was not able to block wind power development as it did in other countries, such as the UK (Bell et al, 2005;Toke, 2005), because town councillors and mayors are recipients of part of the wind power benefits.…”

“…Wind power planning was fairly innovative in its beginning: when turbines were still strange, local administrations set up very inclusive steering committees so as to benefit from all competences in assessing the first projects, but these committees tended to be cut back to the administration as procedures became routine. In the end, wind power planning became more open to developers than to other parties, somewhat reintegrating the usual French meso-corporatism in environmental policy, whereby access to policy-making is restricted to a set of corporations (Szarka, 2004(Szarka, , 2007.…”

“…After 7 years of one of the highest feed-in tariffs in Europe (Ministry of Economy, 2000, 2001, 2006a, the installed capacity is still very low (1.8 GW) compared with other countries which have relied on the same type of tariffs: Spain (11.6 GW), Germany (20.6 GW) and Denmark (3.14 GW) (figures from the end of 2006, Observ'er, 2007a). Institutional lock-in into nuclear energy is one reason that explains the French case (Szarka, 2007). Another reason is a diffuse pattern of administrative landscape protection which impacts on the construction of wind farms.…”

Network management and renewable energy development: An analytical framework with empirical illustrations

“…ideas about the policy problem and its possible solutions-and form coalitions with likeminded actors to influence the policy process (see also the ACF-framework [88,102]). Coalitions, either for or against wind power development, often emerge at the local level and the interplay between these coalitions can have significant impacts on development processes [95].…”

“…In addressing why there was not a "wind power rush" in France following the implementation of a feed-in tariff scheme, as there had been in other countries, Szarka [95] references the importance of "mobilising discourses" and "discourse coalitions." Discourses, in this case, are essentially ways of framing policy issues and illustrate how actors conceive of their goals.…”