2020
DOI: 10.54648/woco2020003
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Why Managers Engage in Price Fixing? An Analytical Framework

Abstract: This article analyses the incentives for a manager to engage in a cartel, by mobilizing the framework of the ‘economics of crime’. We apply a cost-benefit analysis, relating to the decision of starting and/or remaining in a cartel, at an individual level, including psychological and behavioural factors. It also examines the various solutions – both at company and public authority level – to limit individual incentives to engage in this type of practice, and the role of public policy, in the broad sense of the … Show more

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