Why Marxism Still Does Not Need Normative Theory

Abstract

Marx did not have a normative theory, that is, a theory that purported to justify, discursively and systematically, his normative opinions, to show them to be rationally obligatory or objectively valid. In this regard, Marx was obviously not alone: almost everyone, including those who lead what are widely regarded as exemplarỳ moral' lives, decide and act on the basis of normative intuitions and inclinations that fall far short of a theory. Yet self-proclaimed Marxists like G. A. Cohen and Jürgen Habermas have reintroduced a kind of normative theory into the Marxian tradition that Marx himself would have ridiculed. This essay defends Marx's position and tries to explain the collapse of Western Marxism into bourgeois practical philosophy, i.e., philosophizing about what ought to be done that is unthreatening to capitalist relations of production.

Think local, act global: Civic vigilance as cosmopolitan political motivation

“…8 While recognizing the importance of the motivational claim, Gould also claims that solidarity relations are constructive of moral obligations(Gould 2007, 162). 9 This is analogous to Marx's theory of revolutionary motivation, as defended in(Leiter 2016). See also Gilbert's account of Marx's democratic internationalism in(Gilbert 1999, 119-47).…”

Being realistic and demanding the impossible

“…Cohen, of using moral discourse to foreground socialist political practice. Both projects revive the importance of normative theory to Marxism, against a long‐standing Marxist current that rejects it (Leiter, ). But both projects are instances of moralism, at least if we interpret the Gramscian approach as involving the construction of positive normative ideals, much as in Cohen.…”

“…And, as our ideology critique will have exposed areas of suspected obfuscation, we will be able to articulate philosophically which questions social science should ask—an eminently normative task, but one still compatible with Humean empiricism, and so with an ideal of fidelity to the facts that chimes with the epistemic standards of current social science. So the realist perspective helps us see how, as Leiter () shows, Marx's avowed anti‐empiricism is unnecessary and even detrimental to his aims. This relates to the issue of the alleged status quo bias of fidelity to the facts.…”

Kant After Marx

“…If Marx’s factual account is true, then the revolution will happen when certain economic circumstances obtain, and normative theory is irrelevant to this process. As Leiter puts it, ‘[i]nstrumental rationality and some assumptions about human desires are all one needs by way of a psychology of revolution’ (2015: 28). If the conditions of people’s lives are so dire that their self-interest weighs heavily in favour of revolutionizing their productive system, then they will do so.…”