This article analyzes the impact of employment institutions on Japanese-, British-, and Chinese-owned textile firms in China during the 1920s and 1930s. Despite Britain's domestic position as a world productivity leader, Japanese firms enjoyed a 70 percent productivity advantage over both British and Chinese competitors. The divergent performance of Japanese and British investments in China is explained by differences in management practice. Japanese firms had domestic experience with employment institutions similar to China's and applied labor management strategies that functioned well under these institutions. British firms lacked the institutional experience necessary to adapt management strategies to Chinese institutions. n the first half of the twentieth century, Japan rapidly absorbed industrial technologies from the West, while other Asian countries such as China and India lagged behind. In textiles, British managers and investors established plants in India, but productivity in these firms stagnated during the first half of the twentieth century, and many of these firms became unprofitable in the face of cheap imports from Japan. A key question in understanding twentieth century development is why Japanese firms were able to transform productivity levels in their economy, while other developing country firms, some run by experienced Western managers, failed. To understand this puzzle, I investigate attempts of British and Japanese firms to transfer textile technology to China during the 1920s and 1930s. The analysis reveals some of the pitfalls which