Why regulators assess risk differently: Regulatory style, business organization, and the varied practice of risk‐based food safety inspections across the EU

Abstract

This article advances scholarship on comparative regulation by moving beyond the conventional focus on formal law and EU comitology to assess the extent of 'practice convergence' in the implementation of EU regulation. Drawing on 50 key informant interviews, a survey, and policy document analysis, we compare how regulators in England, Germany, France and the Netherlands have implemented EU requirements that food safety inspections be 'risk-based'. Focusing on a clear dependent variable -risk-scoring methods -we find important differences in the conception and targeting of risk-based inspections; with starkly different conclusions about what kind of food businesses they need to target to ensure safety within an ostensibly harmonised single market. We attribute variation in the implementation of risk-based inspection to the ways that EU requirements were filtered through long-entrenched regulatory styles and modes of food business organisation in each country, reinforcing pre-existing inspection practices in the design of new risk-based tools.

Defining Food Safety Inspection

“…Yet the conceptualization of risk and the way it is applied is not universal amongst inspectors and regulatory authorities. For some inspectors, risk should form the basis for determining which food premises are inspected and how regularly this occurs [ 4 , 43 ]. To some, the frequency of inspection should be determined by risk calculated on food premises compliance history [ 43 ].…”

“…Here, risk conceptualization is focused on patterns of observed food handling behavior and compliance. For others, prioritizing premises for inspection with a basis on risk may consider the capacity of food producers to manage their food safety requirements inhouse, or may consider the number of persons potentially exposed to the food products [ 4 ]. This conceptualization of risk is focused on the reliability of internal assurance systems and reproducibility, to control the likelihood of foodborne illness.…”

“…However, the approach of collaborative problem solving is not always applied during inspections and can depend on the willingness of food business associates to adopt a learning perspective, and the extent to which inspectors trust that the food business associate will resolve the issue [ 34 ]. These approaches can also cause internal conflict for inspectors, particularly where inspectors strive to protect consumers with thoroughness and completeness in their identification of issues that could lead to foodborne illness [ 4 ].…”

“…To combat foodborne illness, many governments have introduced health protection measures and food safety regulatory systems. Food safety inspection is a health protection method employed by many food safety regulators worldwide [ 4 ]. Food safety inspection can take various forms when applied at different stages of the food production system.…”

“…These scoring systems can be weighted where more points are deducted for some non-compliances over others, or can be designed to determine maximum scores that can be achieved where some specific non-compliances are observed [ 10 ]. Where a scoring system is applied, regulatory systems often prescribe actions to be taken by the regulator in response to score ranges, such as enforcement, or ongoing inspection frequency [ 4 , 8 , 11 ]. Compliance-check systems may also be in place where the regulatory system includes public disclosure of inspection results [ 10 ].…”