Why Responsible Belief Is Permissible Belief

Abstract

IntroductionIt is widely thought that we are at least sometimes responsible for our doxastic attitudes. We can be praised, blamed, or neutrally appraised for our beliefs, disbeliefs, and withholdings. However, many epistemologists have also pointed out that, despite the fact that we are responsible both for certain actions and for certain beliefs, there are crucial differences between responsibility for beliefs and responsibility for actions. In this paper we discuss one such alleged difference, namely that whereas in many circumstances two or more different actions are equally permissible, our evidence is always such that there is a unique doxastic attitude that we are epistemically obliged to have given that evidence. We call this thesis the Uniqueness Thesis (UT) and its denial the Permissibility Thesis (PT). Like many authors writing on this topic, we will interpret the issue deontologically: for a belief to be obliged or permitted is for it to be responsible or blameless. Thus, we do not understand the issue merely evaluatively, but deontologically: the question is not whether doxastic attitudes are obliged or rather merely permitted if they are to be ideally rational or ideally reasonable. The central aim of this paper is to defend PT by rebutting certain arguments against PT and by providing some considerations that favour PT over UT. If we succeed, we have shown that there is good reason to think that responsible or blameless belief is permissible rather than obliged belief. Also, if we succeed, we have shown that the gap between the way we should normatively assess belief and action may not be as wide as has been thought. This paper is structured as follows. First, we distinguish between several varieties of UT and PT and select those that we deem relevant to our discussion ( § 2). Next, we discuss a couple of objections to PT and argue that they fail ( § 3). However, even if we are correct that they do not succeed, it does not follow that UT is false. Therefore, we also discuss two arguments for PT ( § 4) and provide two motivations for PT by showing that it is entailed by two views that are quite popular among theorists working on doxastic responsibility ( § 5). Even if our strategy does not establish or demonstrate the truth of PT, it will provide enough reasons to prefer PT over UT. Varieties of PT and UTLet us start with a word on the terms that we and others working on this issue employ. It seems natural to think that every epistemically obliged belief is an *This paper is a collaborative effort to which each of us has contributed equally. bs_bs_banner

The Uniqueness Thesis

“…On the second reading, which is logically stronger, every person in the world is rationally required to settle upon the very same attitude toward the proposition in question if they have that same body of evidence. Call this “Interpersonal Uniqueness.” This distinction has already attracted attention in the literature, since various authors have argued that some of the early arguments for Uniqueness in White () rely upon an equivocation between these two (Kelly ; Meacham ; Peels and Booth ; Titelbaum and Kopec ms.).…”

“…For example, Feldman (), Kelly (), Ballantyne and Coffman (), Cohen (), and Schoenfield (), among others, have argued that there are tight relationships between various versions of Uniqueness and conciliatory views about disagreement. But others (e.g., Christensen , forthcoming; Lee ; Peels and Booth ; Levinstein forthcoming; Titelbaum and Kopec ms.) have made the case that the relationship between Uniqueness and conciliatory views is much more complicated. And outside of the epistemology of disagreement, Uniqueness is proving to have implications for topics as far ranging as the epistemology of trust and friendship (Hawley ), diachronic rationality (Hedden ), and the epistemic value of deliberation (Peter ).…”

“…Call this "Interpersonal Uniqueness." This distinction has already attracted attention in the literature, since various authors have argued that some of the early arguments for Uniqueness in White (2005) rely upon an equivocation between these two (Kelly 2013;Meacham 2014;Peels and Booth 2014;Titelbaum and Kopec ms.).…”

“…For example, among those who argue in favor of the thesis are Feldman (, ), White (, , ), Christensen (), Matheson (), Horowitz (), Greco and Hedden (forthcoming), and Dogramaci and Horowitz (forthcoming). Among those who argue against the thesis are Douven (), Titelbaum (), Brueckner and Bundy (), Decker (), Rosa (), Kelly (), Meacham (), Peels and Booth (), Schoenfield (), Kopec (), Sharadin (forthcoming), Simpson (ms.), and Titelbaum and Kopec (ms.).…”

The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement

“… Enoch makes this point in (2011: 208).23 Among the non-permissivists areChristensen (2007),Feldman (2007),Greco and Hedden (2017),Horowitz (2014),Matheson (2011), and White (2013). The permissivists include Decker (2012),Kelly (2013), Meachem (2014),Peels and Booth (2014), Schoenfield (2014), Sharadin (2015), andTitelbaum (2010).…”