Why Rules Matter: Changes in Candidate Selection in Mexico's PRI, 1988–2000

Langston, Joy

doi:10.1017/s0022216x01006137

Cited by 42 publications

(16 citation statements)

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“…In Mexico, the ruling party's central leadership controlled the nomination processes and, owing to a system of nonreelection for all competitive offices, the party could induce strong discipline from subnational office-seekers who had an incentive to align with the party leadership and with the president to obtain access to future rent-seeking positions. Langston's (2001Langston's ( , 2006 work persuasively shows that this regime began to crumble when the leadership lost control of the nomination process.…”

Section: Building Mass Supportmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Order and One-Party Rule

Magaloni¹,

Kricheli

2010

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

427

229

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The second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of oneparty autocracies. One-party regimes have become the most common type of authoritarian rule and have proved to be more stable and to grow faster than other types of authoritarianism. We review the literature on one-party rule and, using data from 1950-2006, suggest four avenues for future research: focusing on autocrats' ability to simultaneously minimize threats from the elites and from the masses; focusing on the conditions that foster the establishment and the collapse of oneparty regimes and on transitions from one type of authoritarianism to another; focusing on the relationship between authoritarian elections and democratization; and focusing on the global and international forces that influence the spread of one-party rule.

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Section: Building Mass Supportmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Order and One-Party Rule

Magaloni¹,

Kricheli

2010

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

427

229

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“…In 1988, the PRI faced its first significant electoral challenge. The "political earthquake" that this election triggered dramatically transformed the terrain of Mexican electoral politics and led to significant reforms in the way the PRI nominated candidates (Langston 2001).…”

Section: Domestic Political Context and Party Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the PRI, meanwhile, a series of crises that occurred in 1994 further enhanced the ability of groups within the party to reform the statutes regarding candidate selection (Langston 2001). The Chiapas rebellion and the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio threw the party into chaos.…”

Section: Domestic Political Context and Party Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico

Baldez

2004

Legislative Studies Qtrly

166

149

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In the past decade, 21 countries have adopted gender quota laws that require between 20% and 50% of all legislative candidates to be women. What explains the adoption of these laws? I argue that three factors make politicians more likely to adopt gender quota laws. First, electoral uncertainty creates an opportunity for internal party reform that factions within a party can exploit to their advantage. Second, the courts play an important role because of the centrality of the issue of equal protection under the law to gender quotas. Finally, cross‐partisan mobilization among female legislators raises the costs of opposing such legislation by drawing public attention to it. I examine these three claims with regard to Mexico, where the federal congress passed a 30% gender quota law in 2002. I'd give up my seat for you if it wasn't for the fact that I'm sitting in it myself. —Groucho Marx (quoted in Abdela 2001) [Many Latin American countries] have ‘homosexual’ political systems, that is, the power of the political parties and the state is in the hands of only one of the sexes.… —Line Bareiro, Paraguayan feminist (Bareiro and Soto 1992, 11)

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“…So there was connivance between the top bureaucrats and politicians.’ (Interview number 23)While further research on this area is needed, it is possible to speculate that one of the reasons why the parliament never tried to reform the system might be related to the functioning of political parties. Similarly to the case of Mexico explored by Langston (2001), in Turkey party leaders have traditionally had strong influence over party members. Parties’ candidate lists are compiled by leaders, while a national electoral threshold of 10% prevents dissidents from separating from their party to form a new one.…”

Section: Empirical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Boon or bane for development? Turkey’s central state bureaucracy and the management of public investment

Luca

2016

Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space

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While Turkey’s use of public monies has been frequently marred by waste and short-term electoral rewarding, recent research suggests that the allocation of public investment across Turkish provinces between 2004 and 2012 was more responsive to socioeconomic needs than electoral politics. The current paper aims to understand this empirical puzzle by exploring whether the ‘relatively sound’ management of public investment can be explained by the characteristics of the central economic bureaucracy. It draws on process-tracing analysis and in-depth elite interviews. In line with the developmental state literature, the analysis argues that authoritative and insulated public administrations are essential for policy effectiveness, particularly in institutional contexts prone to a high politicisation of the public purse. Yet, in order to prevent bureaucratic capture, bureaus must also be accountable. The analysis in particular shows how increasing the transparency of the state and allowing a stronger oversight of policy performance by the public and the media are extremely important. Conversely, transformations which simply reduce the powers of strong, top-down bureaucracies to increase the indiscriminate control by governments – such as the ones which have occurred in Turkey in recent years – will not lead to stronger institutions, but merely produce different ineffective and unsustainable structures.

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Why Rules Matter: Changes in Candidate Selection in Mexico's PRI, 1988–2000

Cited by 42 publications

References 0 publications

Political Order and One-Party Rule

Political Order and One-Party Rule

Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico

Boon or bane for development? Turkey’s central state bureaucracy and the management of public investment

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