Why should any body have a self?

Abstract

We use a general computational framework for brain function to develop a theory of the self. The theory is that the self is an inferred model of endogenous, deeply hidden causes of behavior. The general framework for brain function on which we base this theory is that the brain is fundamentally an organ for prediction error minimization.There are three related parts to this project. In the first part (Sections 2-3), we explain how prediction error minimization must lead to the inference of a network of deeply hidden endogenous causes. The key concept here is that prediction error minimization in the long term approximates hierarchical Bayesian inference, where the hierarchy is critical to understand the place of the self, and the body, in the world.In the second part (Sections 4-5), we discuss why such a set of hidden endogenous causes should qualify as a self. We show how a comprehensive prediction error minimization account can accommodate key characteristics of the self. It turns out that, though the modelled endogenous causes are just some among other inferred causes of sensory input, the model is special in being, in a special sense, a model of itself.The third part (Sections 6-7) identifies a threat from such self-modelling: how can a self-model be accurate if it represents itself? We propose that we learn to be who we are through a positive feedback loop: from infancy onward, humans apply agent-models to understand what other agents are up to in their environment, and actively align themselves with those models. Accurate self-models arise and are sustained as a natural consequence of humans’ skill in modeling and interacting with each other. The concluding section situates this inferentialist yet realist theory of the self with respect to narrative conceptions of the self.

“I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context of Consciousness

“…It includes numerous attempts to understand different facets of the self, such as sense of bodily ownership ( Apps and Tsakiris, 2014 ), sense of self in agency and perception ( Hohwy, 2007 ), the influence of interoception on self-consciousness ( Seth et al, 2011 ; Seth, 2013 ), social aspects of the self ( Moutoussis et al, 2014 ; Friston and Frith, 2015 ), the relationship with minimal phenomenal selfhood ( Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013 ), and even psychodynamical interpretations of the self ( Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010 ; Fotopoulou, 2012 ). The most comprehensive treatment of the self from the PC perspective ( Hohwy and Michael, 2017 ) also exemplifies most of the crucial points made by other PC theories of the self. At the beginning of their paper Hohwy and Michael (2017) describe the self in the following words:…”

“…The most comprehensive treatment of the self from the PC perspective ( Hohwy and Michael, 2017 ) also exemplifies most of the crucial points made by other PC theories of the self. At the beginning of their paper Hohwy and Michael (2017) describe the self in the following words:…”

“…(…) we discuss why such a set of hidden endogenous causes should qualify as a self. ( Hohwy and Michael, 2017 , p. 363)…”

“…On the other hand, I may fail to notice any congruence between my intentions and the movement and hence infer that the hidden cause behind the movement I observe is some other person. According to Hohwy and Michael (2017) , the self is just a set of such hidden endogenous causes. Although not necessarily in full agreement with this picture in regard to the details, all other PC theories of the self listed above also speak about the self as underpinned by hierarchy of generative models, which are preoccupied with conducting probabilistic inference aimed to infer hidden causes of observed data patterns.…”

Am I Self-Conscious? (Or Does Self-Organization Entail Self-Consciousness?)

“…Some notable contributions over the past years include (Seth et al, 2011 ; Ainley et al, 2012 , 2016 ; Barrett and Satpute, 2013 ; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013 ; Seth, 2013 , 2014a ; Barrett and Simmons, 2015 ; Seth and Friston, 2016 ; Stephan et al, 2016 ; Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017b ). A less interoceptive-centric conception of self is pursued in Hohwy and Michael ( 2017 ), where self is considered as a hypothesis or explanation that seamlessly explains experience over multiple timescales and modalities. On this view, the “self” is constituted by deeply hidden causes that transcend our forward or generative models of introception:…”