Why States Act through Formal International Organizations

Abbott, Kenneth W.; Snidal, Duncan

doi:10.1177/0022002798042001001

Cited by 1,080 publications

(397 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…And in fact, numerous prominent IGOs were created in this manner, as demonstrated in the case studies. 6 Keohane 1984;Abbott and Snidal 1998;Koremenos, Lipson, andSnidal 2001. 7 Nielson andHawkins et al 2006.…”

Section: Joint United Nations Program On Hiv/aids (Unaids)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…11 Abbott and Snidal 1998;Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001. 12 Abbott and Snidal 1998;Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001. policy coordination. Thus, a subgroup of OECD member-states demanded a new IGO to address the cooperation problems created by the oil shock.…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…15 Abbott andSnidal 1998. See Jupille andSnidal (2006) for conditions under which states prefer institutionalized cooperation.…”

Section: First Stage: Choosing Whether To Delegatementioning

confidence: 99%

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International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot

Johnson¹,

Urpelainen²

2014

Int Org

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Bureaucrats working in international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) regularly help states design new IGOs. Sometimes international bureaucrats possess only limited discretion in institutional design; at other times, they enjoy broad discretion. In fact, they gain discretion even when they openly oppose state preferences. This contravenes conventional thinking about delegation: discretion should decrease as preference divergence between states and international bureaucrats increases. We develop a principal-agent theory of how much discretion states grant to international bureaucrats in the design of new IGOs. This is novel: while principal-agent theories of international delegation are common, scholars have not analyzed principal-agent relationships in the creation of new IGOs. We argue that even an international bureaucracy that disagrees with states' design preferences may enjoy substantial design leeway, due to states' need for bureaucratic expertise. In developing this argument, we employ a formal principal-agent model, case studies, and an original dataset.

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Section: Joint United Nations Program On Hiv/aids (Unaids)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theory and Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

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International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot

Johnson¹,

Urpelainen²

2014

Int Org

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“…The predominant view within international relations is that nation-states create institutions to further their own interests (Abbott and Snidal 1998;Koremenos et al 2001). When those institutions fail to sufficiently serve those interests, dissatisfied states will naturally desire change (Young 1982).…”

Section: Studies Of Countervailing Institutional Creationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The proliferation of multilateral development banks

Kellerman

2018

Rev Int Organ

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Since 1945 the number of multilateral development banks (MDBs) has increased at a linear rate, with approximately one new MDB created every three years. The proliferation of MDBs has resulted in an inefficient duplication of international institutions with overlapping functions. Further, this trend contradicts our existing understanding of why states create countervailing international organizations. This article proposes a novel, two-step theoretical model of institutional change and creation in an attempt to explain this empirical puzzle. Utilizing the complementarities of rational-choice and historical institutionalism, the model demonstrates that the rational actions of states in the past can lead to seemingly irrational institutional change in the future. This process results in the repetitive creation of countervailing MDBs designed to solve the same functional problems. To evaluate the model's hypotheses, three case studies are undertaken, employing archival material, internal documents, and 48 interviews conducted by the author in London, Washington, D.C. and Manila, Philippines. The empirical results are of direct interest to policy-makers currently negotiating the structure of new MDBs in Asia and Latin America.

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“…Generally speaking, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) can be geared towards facilitating the negotiation and implementation of agreements (e.g., G20, UNFCCC), resolving disputes (e.g., WTO), carrying out operational activities like technical assistance (e.g., World Bank, OECD), elaborating norms (e.g., G20, UNFCCC, WTO), and providing information (virtually all IGOs), among other functions (Keohane 1984;Abbott and Snidal 1998). Most organizations in the regime complex for energy subsidies perform more than one function, though each carries out its own unique combination of functions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%