Why states inform: Compliance with self-reporting obligations in universal treaty regimes

Abstract

Why do some states largely comply with their self-reporting obligations in international institutions, while others fulfil them only irregularly? In this article, I conduct the first large- N analysis of self-reporting that comprises several important areas of international cooperation. This analysis relies on an original and large dataset that covers self-reporting within 25 universal arms control, environmental and human rights agreements. The empirical results find little evidence for an intuitive view that the support of states for the respective treaties and the conformity of state policies with the general goals of those treaties drive compliance with self-reporting obligations. Instead, the article reveals that this compliance is mainly influenced by the reporting behaviour of the country’s regional peers and by national economic and administrative capacities.

Building an International Cybersecurity Regime

“…56 In other words, the Chinese approach inverts the Russian notion. 57 To be sure, the Chinese state tightly controls the flow of information to and from the country's borders, but there is less evidence to indicate that Beijing sees information as a strategic asset, as much as a tool to preserve political stability. The focus of "cyber sovereignty" is primarily on the "network physical facility," i.e.…”

“…Efforts to promote international norms in specific issue areas, such as cyber crime and supply chain integrity, are more likely to gain traction and thereby increase the prospects for security in cyberspace." 57 Nye alludes to a similar goal, writing of cybersecurity norms development that "Progress in some areas need not wait for progress in others." 58 Efforts to divide and conquer cybersecurity-related topics through separate norm development processes have met with some success, particularly when it comes to cooperation on cybercrime, but these different areas are so intertwined that such discussions are often challenging to cleanly separate.…”

“…For example, this approach has been used to help inform the International Telecommunications Union and other negotiations through an International Digital Economy and Telecommunications Advisory Committee. 57 Of course, such a formal committee would necessarily have limited membership.…”

“…debated by other states 55 and made suggestions on the language of the final reports. 56 India has been firm and persistent at OEWG conversations on trusted supply chains, and protection of critical information infrastructure, 57 and has also advanced a coherent and well-designed agenda for capacity building, including through the development of a Global Cyber Security Cooperation Portal. 58 This emphasis stems from a convergence of state interests with that of the private sector.…”

“…55 Yet there is substantial evidence that it is effective in the human rights realm, 56 and it is a common feature of environmental agreements, including the Paris Agreement on climate change. 57 It is wrong to assume the principal motive of all states is to avoid complying with the norms they commit to. The opposite may be truer: many states want to live up to the commitments they make and want to be seen to do so.…”