Why the Direct Argument Does Not Shift the Burden of Proof

Loewenstein, Yael

doi:10.5840/jphil2016113412

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Despite the preceding discussion, Loewenstein (2016) I agree that a satisfying compatibilist-friendly story should account for the apparent validity of cases like Snakebite and Plato; however, it seems to me that the story on o er here does just that. ...…”

Section: A Rejoinder To (A2)?mentioning

confidence: 90%

“…Coming to McKenna's defense, Loewenstein (2016) argues that Reprimand does not appropriately support Transfer NR's validity. Central to her argument is what she calls "the epistemic condition on moral responsibility".…”

Section: A Rejoinder To (A1)?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This paper opened with McKenna's position, on which discussions of Transfer NR's validity "should never have even gotten o the ground" (2008, p. 370). The paper then discussed Schnall and Widerker's (2012) replies, along with Loewenstein's (2016) Fischer (in Fischer & Ravizza, 1998, chp. 6) has made invaluable contributions to discussions of Transfer NR's validity, which include producing preemption-and simultaneous overdeterminationcounterexamples (sometimes called "2-path-counterexamples") to Transfer NR.…”

Section: Fischer's Positionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The direct argument is a prima facie threat to compatibilism

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2020

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* I am deeply indebted to David Widerker both for encouraging me to write this paper, and for his insightful suggestions and advice. I am also heavily indebted to several anonymous reviewers for questions, criticisms and suggestions that greatly improved the paper. Further thanks go to the participants of the 2019 Free Will and Methodology conference at KU Leuven, and to the participants of the 2020 Conference of the Israeli Philosophy Association. Their comments and questions were invaluable to me. Finally, my writing was aided by the generous support of the Department of Philosophy and Kreitman School of Advanced Studies at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. 1 The argument is called the "Direct Argument" because it makes no explicit assumptions about the necessary conditions of moral responsibility. It thereby di ers from more traditional arguments, which often make the widely doubted assumption that the possibility of alternatives is necessary for moral responsibility [for the locus classicus of these doubts, see Frankfurt (1969)]. The Direct Argument's name is due to Fischer and Ravizza (1998, chp. 6). 2 The rule's name follows Fischer and Ravizza (1998, chp. 6) and Widerker (2002).

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Section: A Rejoinder To (A2)?mentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: A Rejoinder To (A1)?mentioning

confidence: 99%