Why the Sociology of Morality Needs Bourdieu's Habitus*

Abstract

Though Pierre Bourdieu has been criticized for ignoring the moral dimensions of social judgments, I suggest that his habitus concept can provide a useful theoretical foundation for a sociological analysis of morality. If the habitus is revised in a way that recognizes the embodied nature of cognition, it can be treated as a foundation for moral judgments of the self and of others. A revised habitus concept can account for two processes by which moral judgments are shaped by social settings: (1) cultural influences on feelings and expressions of emotion; and (2) the ways moral metaphors are structured by embodied cognitive schemas. In both processes, universal bodily operations are employed in different configurations across cultural settings. I argue that a modified habitus concept that can account for these phenomena has significant implications for the sociological analysis of lay morality.

‘Moral ecology’ and ‘moral capital’: tools towards a sociology of moral education from a South African ethnography

“…It is only in the past 15 years, however, that a growing call for a systematic sociology of morality has emerged (see, for example, Stivers, 1996;Thiele, 1996;Davydova & Sharrock, 2003;Pharo, 2005;Zdrenka, 2006;Abend, 2008;Ignatow, 2009;Swartz, 2009;Kang & Glassman, 2010). Amongst these, Abend (2008), argues for sociological inquiry into morality focused on 'empirical accounts of people's moral beliefs, and their causes and consequences' (p. 120); Pharo (2005), drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's (1997) social and cultural reproduction theory, argues that the concept of choice, prevalent in conventional moral discourses, be replaced by an analysis of 'social settings [that] do not depend on agents' decisions…[but on] situations like scarcity of goods, lack of political liberty, sexual oppression, restriction of social perspectives' (no page numbers on text); and Thiele (1996) advocates a sociology of morality that investigates the origins and 'disputes' concerning moral authority' (p. 7).…”

The Old One-Two: Preserving Analytical Dualism in Psychological Sociology

“…Like many of our colleagues (e.g., Lizardo 2004Lizardo , 2009Ignatow 2007Ignatow , 2009, this volume), we are quite optimistic about bringing together cognitive science and the Bourdieusian tradition and we hope our argument is interpreted with this in mind. Our concern is that the Bourdieusian distaste for "dualisms" risks rendering this cross-pollination less fruitful than it might otherwise be.…”

“…The second belief is that sociologists should pay more attention to research in the cognitive sciences (used here broadly to include psychology, neuroscience, and related disciplines) to outline a set of cognitively realistic principles that can inform the construction of a better theory of action (see e.g., DiMaggio 1997;Lizardo 2007;Vaisey 2009). The third belief is that the theoretical tradition of Pierre Bourdieu can serve as a bridge between sociology and the cognitive sciences that will facilitate better answers to questions about why people do the things they do (Lizardo 2004;Ignatow 2009;Vaisey 2009). …”

Racial Habitus, Moral Conflict, and White Moral Hegemony Within Interracial Evangelical Organizations

“…Despite the obvious implications of the habitus concept for understanding the macromicro dynamics of social morality, Bourdieu largely ignored the ethical dimensions of social judgments (Ignatow 2009;Lamont 1992;Sayer 2005). Ignatow (2009Ignatow ( , 2010 has suggested that a modified habitus concept, one that recognizes the embodied nature of cognition, provides a helpful framework for sociological analyses of morality.…”

“…Ignatow (2009Ignatow ( , 2010 has suggested that a modified habitus concept, one that recognizes the embodied nature of cognition, provides a helpful framework for sociological analyses of morality. According to Bourdieu (1984), the habitus comprises bodily phenomena (e.g., posture, manners, and accent) and cognitive schemas, both of which come into play when making moral judgments.…”