From its inception, one of liberalism's main concerns with regard to legitimacy and power was to upgrade individuals from subjects of a king to citizens of a state. The change in status had important implications for children. As subjects, there is little distinction between children and adults, for both are equally under the king's authority. Citizens of a state, however, are those who consent to authority as the basis of political power, which makes it paramount to distinguish between those who have the rational capacity to consent and those who do not. Children are often viewed as lacking such capacities. And even if many children prove to rise above the epistemic threshold, infants do not. 1 Epistemic impairment has been the decisive yardstick when excluding infants from political agency. In general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and 'agency' denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. Whereas personal agency entails the capacities to form, realise, and revise temporally-extended plans, political agency involves the capacity to act in concert with others by exercising political power. From this viewpoint, infants are utterly incapable of being 'normative 1 By 'infants' I mean those children, mostly babies and toddlers, who are not-yet-in-language (Duhn 2015), the typical standard for assessing epistemic competence. The reason I focus on infants is that they are excluded from (theoretical and practical) political forms especially devised to include children who are capable of participating in some stage of decision-making (