Why the World Needs an International Cyberwar Convention

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette

doi:10.1007/s13347-017-0271-5

Cited by 18 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…However, those institutions had the express support of the US and may have simply manifested state power in institutional form. Efforts to ban LAWS and create a cyberwarfare convention have been broadly opposed by states with an established technological superiority in these areas (Eilstrup‐Sangiovanni, 2018).…”

Section: Discussion: What Would History Suggest?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fragmentation and the Future: Investigating Architectures for International AI Governance

2020

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The international governance of artificial intelligence (AI) is at a crossroads: should it remain fragmented or be centralised? We draw on the history of environment, trade, and security regimes to identify advantages and disadvantages in centralising AI governance. Some considerations, such as efficiency and political power, speak for centralisation. The risk of creating a slow and brittle institution, and the difficulty of pairing deep rules with adequate participation, speak against it. Other considerations depend on the specific design. A centralised body may be able to deter forum shopping and ensure policy coordination. However, forum shopping can be beneficial, and fragmented institutions could self-organise. In sum, these trade-offs should inform development of the AI governance architecture, which is only now emerging. We apply the tradeoffs to the case of the potential development of high-level machine intelligence. We conclude with two recommendations. First, the outcome will depend on the exact design of a central institution. A well-designed centralised regime covering a set of coherent issues could be beneficial. But locking-in an inadequate structure may pose a fate worse than fragmentation. Second, fragmentation will likely persist for now. The developing landscape should be monitored to see if it is self-organising or simply inadequate. Policy Implications • Secretariats of emerging AI initiatives, for example, the OECD AI Policy Observatory, Global Partnership on AI, the UN High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation, and the UN System Chief Executives Board (CEB) should coordinate to halt and reduce further regime fragmentation. • There is an important role for academia to play in providing objective monitoring and assessment of the emerging AI regime complex to assess its conflict, coordination, and catalysts to address governance gaps without vested interests. Secretariats of emerging AI initiatives should be similarly empowered to monitor the emerging regime. The CEB appears particularly well placed and mandated to address this challenge, but other options exist. • What AI issues and applications need to be tackled in tandem is an open question on which the centralisation debate sensitively turns. We encourage scholars across AI issues from privacy to military applications to organise venues to more closely consider this vital question. • Non-state actors, especially those with technical expertise, will have a potent influence in either a fragmented or centralised regime. These contributions need to be used, but there also need to be safeguards in place against regulatory capture. • The AI regime complex is at an embryonic stage, where informed interventions may be expected to have an outsized impact. The effect of academics as norm entrepreneurs should not be underestimated at this point.

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Section: Discussion: What Would History Suggest?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fragmentation and the Future: Investigating Architectures for International AI Governance

2020

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“…This recommendation can be accompanied with a corollary. 15 The Wassenaar debate supports the arguments that the concept of dual-use has already long ago lost most of its analytical power (Burkart and McCourt, 2017;Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018;Rath et al, 2014;Rajeswari, 1998;Williams-Jones et al, 2014). If it is admitted that cyber security differs from conventional security, it is also logical to make a subsequent policy recommendation:…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Updating the Wassenaar debate once again: Surveillance, intrusion software, and ambiguity

Ruohonen¹,

Kimppa

2019

Journal of Information Technology & Politics

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This paper analyzes a recent debate on regulating cyber weapons through multilateral export controls. The background relates to the amending of the international Wassenaar Arrangement with offensive cyber security technologies known as intrusion software. Implicitly, such software is related to previously unregulated software vulnerabilities and exploits, which also make the ongoing debate particularly relevant. By placing the debate into a historical context, the paper reveals interesting historical parallels, elaborates the political background, and underlines many ambiguity problems related to rigorous definitions for cyber weapons. Many difficult problems remaining for framing offensive security tools with multilateral export controls are also pointed out.

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Section: The Limitations Of 'Centralisation Vs Decentralisation' Debmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should Artificial Intelligence Governance be Centralised?: Design Lessons from History

2020

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Can effective international governance for artificial intelligence remain fragmented, or is there a need for a centralised international organisation for AI? We draw on the history of other international regimes to identify advantages and disadvantages in centralising AI governance. Some considerations, such as efficiency and political power, speak in favour of centralisation. Conversely, the risk of creating a slow and brittle institution speaks against it, as does the difficulty in securing participation while creating stringent rules. Other considerations depend on the specific design of a centralised institution. A well-designed body may be able to deter forum shopping and ensure policy coordination. However, forum shopping can be beneficial and a fragmented landscape of institutions can be self-organising. Centralisation entails trade-offs and the details matter. We conclude with two core recommendations. First, the outcome will depend on the exact design of a central institution. A well-designed centralised regime covering a set of coherent issues could be beneficial. But locking-in an inadequate structure may pose a fate worse than fragmentation. Second, for now fragmentation will likely persist. This should be closely monitored to see if it is self-organising or simply inadequate.

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Why the World Needs an International Cyberwar Convention

Cited by 18 publications

References 20 publications

Fragmentation and the Future: Investigating Architectures for International AI Governance

Fragmentation and the Future: Investigating Architectures for International AI Governance

Updating the Wassenaar debate once again: Surveillance, intrusion software, and ambiguity

Should Artificial Intelligence Governance be Centralised?: Design Lessons from History

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