Why there isn’t inter-level causation in mechanisms

Abstract

The experimental interventions that provide evidence of causal relations are notably similar to those that provide evidence of constitutive relevance relations. In the first two sections, I show that this similarity creates a tension: there is an inconsistent triad between (1) Woodward's popular interventionist theory of causation, (2) Craver's mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, and a variety of arguments for (3) the incoherence of inter-level causation. I argue for an interpretation of the views in which the tension is merely apparent. I propose to explain inter-level relations without inter-level causation by appealing to the notion of fat-handed interventions, and an argument against inter-level causation which dissolves the problem.

Making Sense of Interlevel Causation in Mechanisms from a Metaphysical Perspective

“…4 One can illustrate this formal characterization with help of the above example changing the hippocampus's activity you can change the mouse's behavior, and vice versa). The same holds for the other lower mechanistic levels: each acting entity is a 3 Many authors argue that the mutual manipulability account and interventionism are incompatible (Leuridan 2012;Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015;Casini and Baumgartner 2016;Romero 2015). Therefore, it remains controversial how to understand the claim that phenomena and mechanisms mutually depend on each other (note that promising attempts have been made to save the combination between constitutive explanation and interventionism; see (Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015;Casini and Baumgartner 2016;Krickel (forthcoming)).…”

“…The behavior of the cells is at a lower mechanistic level than the person playing tennis because the former is a component of the mechanism that is responsible for the person's tennis playing. It has been argued by different authors that the notion of a mechanistic level does not allow for interlevel causation (Craver 2007;Craver and Bechtel 2007;Bechtel 2008;Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015;Casini and Baumgartner 2016;Romero 2015;Gebharter 2015). Hence, it is argued, the putative cases of bottom-up and top-down causation indeed cannot be given a strict causal reading.…”

“…One reason for this denial of interlevel causation in mechanisms stems from the fact that the interlevel relation (mutual manipulability) is spelled out in terms of interventionism. Michael Baumgartner and Alexander Gebharter (2015), and Felipe Romero (2015) argue that interventions into higher-level phenomena are necessarily fathanded in the sense that they necessarily change the higher-level phenomenon and at the same time one of the components of the mechanism at the lower level. Hence, these interventions are not ideal and thus cannot establish a causal relation between the two levels.…”

“…(The Metaphysical Argument) 5 A further metaphysical reason to deny interlevel causation in mechanisms that is independent of the interventionist approach is the causal exclusion argument (Gebharter 2015;Romero 2015;Kim 2005). I will not address this objection here because, first, the objection discussed in this paper is more fundamental than objections based on exclusion worries.…”

Saving the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance

“…The most prominent approach of how to understand this constitution relation is Carl Craver's mutual manipulability approach to constitutive relevance. Recently, the mutual manipulability approach has come under attack (Leuridan 2012;Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015;Romero 2015;Harinen 2014;Casini and Baumgartner 2016). Roughly, it is argued that this approach is inconsistent because it is spelled out in terms of interventionism (which is an approach to causation), whereas constitutive relevance is said to be a non-causal relation.…”