Why Think for Yourself?

Matheson, Jonathan

doi:10.1017/epi.2021.49

Cited by 11 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 62 publications

(88 reference statements)

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“…We often and predictably do much better with regard to knowledge by relying on testimony, rather than by doing our own research. The former is routinely more reliable than the latter; doing our own research risks the truth of our beliefs and their justification (Matheson, 2022 ).…”

Section: The Value Of Engagementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There’s therefore a prima facie case for doing one’s own research, not instead of deferring, but alongside it. Jonathan Matheson (Matheson, 2022 ), who has identified the conflict between doing one’s own research and securing knowledge before me, prescribes a similar response: research for understanding; deference for truth. But Matheson overlooks the risks of doing one’s own research.…”

Section: Engaging For Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do your own research!

Levy

2022

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Philosophical tradition and conspiracy theorists converge in suggesting that ordinary people ought to do their own research, rather than accept the word of others. In this paper, I argue that it’s no accident that conspiracy theorists value lay research on expert topics: such research is likely to undermine knowledge, via its effects on truth and justification. Accepting expert testimony is a far more reliable route to truth. Nevertheless, lay research has a range of benefits; in particular, it is likely to lead to greater understanding, even when it does not lead to knowledge. I argue that we can reap most of the genuine benefits of lay research while minimizing the risks by engaging in exploratory, rather than truth-directed, inquiry. To engage in exploratory inquiry is to engage dogmatically, expecting to be unable to confirm the expert view or to disconfirm rivals.

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Section: The Value Of Engagementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Engaging For Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do your own research!

Levy

2022

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Bad social norms rather than bad believers: examining the role of social norms in bad beliefs

Müller

2024

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People with bad beliefs — roughly beliefs that conflict with those of the relevant experts and are maintained regardless of counter-evidence — are often cast as bad believers. Such beliefs are seen to be the result of, e.g., motivated or biased cognition and believers are judged to be epistemically irrational and blameworthy in holding them. Here I develop a novel framework to explain why people form bad beliefs. People with bad beliefs follow the social epistemic norms guiding how agents are supposed to form and share beliefs within their respective communities. Beliefs go bad because these norms aren’t reliably knowledge-conducive. In other words, bad beliefs aren’t due to bad believers but due bad social epistemic norms. The framework also unifies different explanations of bad beliefs, is testable and provides distinct interventions to combat such beliefs. The framework also helps to capture the complex and often contextual normative landscape surrounding bad beliefs more adequately. On this picture, it’s primarily groups that are to be blamed for bad beliefs. I also suggest that some individuals will be blameless for forming their beliefs in line with their group’s norms, whereas others won’t be. And I draw attention to the factors that influence blameworthiness-judgements in these contexts.

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Coordination in social learning: expanding the narrative on the evolution of social norms

Müller

2024

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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A shared narrative in the literature on the evolution of cooperation maintains that social learning evolves early to allow for the transmission of cumulative culture. Social norms, whilst present at the outset, only rise to prominence later on, mainly to stabilise cooperation against the threat of defection. In contrast, I argue that once we consider insights from social epistemology, an expansion of this narrative presents itself: An interesting kind of social norm — an epistemic coordination norm — was operative in early and important instances of specialised social learning. I show how there’s a need for such norms in two key social learning strategies and explain how this need is constituted. In assessor-teaching (e.g. Castro et al., 2019b, 2021), epistemic coordination norms allow agents to coordinate around the content of social learning, i.e., what is to be known and how this is to be done. These norms also allow agents to coordinate around the form of cultural learning in what’s sometimes called strategic social learning (Laland, 2004; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Heyes, 2018, Chap. 5) and elsewhere. Broadly speaking, this concerns how cultural learning is organised within the social group. The upshot is that the evolution of social learning and social norms are intertwined in important and underappreciated ways from early on. The above matters as it informs our views about the evolution of social norms more generally. Truly social norms emerged to coordinate a plurality of complex behaviours and interactions, amongst them specialised social learning. I substantiate this view by contrasting it with Jonathan Birch’s views on the evolution of norms. What results is a general but cohesive narrative on the early evolution of social norms.

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Why Think for Yourself?

Cited by 11 publications

References 62 publications

Do your own research!

Do your own research!

Bad social norms rather than bad believers: examining the role of social norms in bad beliefs

Coordination in social learning: expanding the narrative on the evolution of social norms

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