1984
DOI: 10.1016/0022-1031(84)90038-6
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Why versus how often: Causal reasoning and the incidence of judgmental bias

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Cited by 49 publications
(31 citation statements)
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“…Negative events and failures to act, on the other hand, have mUltiple sufficient causes and are not subject to conjunction effects. This interpretation of the conjunction fallacy in terms of the perceived sufficiency of explana tions is also supported by the work ofAbelson et al (1987), Jaspars (1983 ),and Read (1987), and is also consistent with work byLocksley & Stangor (1984).In a different interpretation of the conjunction fallacy in social explanation, Zuckerman et al(1986) maintained that in estimating the probability of an interpretation for an event, judges may either assess whether the event can give rise to the interpretation (an inference set) or whether the interpretation Annu.Rev. Psychol.…”
supporting
confidence: 79%
“…Negative events and failures to act, on the other hand, have mUltiple sufficient causes and are not subject to conjunction effects. This interpretation of the conjunction fallacy in terms of the perceived sufficiency of explana tions is also supported by the work ofAbelson et al (1987), Jaspars (1983 ),and Read (1987), and is also consistent with work byLocksley & Stangor (1984).In a different interpretation of the conjunction fallacy in social explanation, Zuckerman et al(1986) maintained that in estimating the probability of an interpretation for an event, judges may either assess whether the event can give rise to the interpretation (an inference set) or whether the interpretation Annu.Rev. Psychol.…”
supporting
confidence: 79%
“…Uncertainty about one's feelings toward a product seems to motivate consumers to engage in causal analysis (Scott 1981). Other research has examined how causal inferences differ from other kinds of inferences, e.g., Locksley and Stangor's (1984) work on "how" versus "why" questions. Consumer researchers will probably want to follow up on Wilson and Dunn's (1986) finding that attitudes toward usage of products differ depending on whether users introspect about reasons for their attitudes towards products or their feelings about products.…”
Section: Current Issues In Attribution Researchmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Meanwhile, conditions have been identified that seem to encourage the use of base rates, and although the effect of the conditions is often reported as weak, this has led to speculations about additional or alternative explanations. The first is the conjecture that base rates are used to the degree they are perceived to be "causally" relevant (Ajzen, 1977;, a conjecture recently modified by the assertion that only causally nonredundant base rates are used (Locksley & Stangor, 1984). The second conjecture is that base rates are neglected insofar as they are remote, pallid and abstract, as opposed to the vividness, salience, and concreteness of individuating information (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975;Nisbett & Ross, 1980).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%