Why virtual friendship is no genuine friendship

Abstract

Based on a modern reading of Aristotle's theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship does not qualify as genuine friendship. By 'virtual friendship' we mean the type of friendship that exists on the internet, and seldom or never is combined with real life interaction. A 'traditional friendship' is, in contrast, the type of friendship that involves substantial real life interaction, and we claim that only this type can merit the label 'genuine friendship' and thus qualify as morally valuable. The upshot of our discussion is that virtual friendship is what Aristotle might have described as a lower and less valuable form of social exchange.

The Impact of Friendship Skills Psycho-education on the Friendship Quality of 9-12 Year-Old Students

“…10 yılı aşkın bir süredir yapılan deneysel çalışmalar yakın arkadaşlık yaşantıları ile bireylerin mutlulukları arasında güçlü bir ilişki olduğunu ve yakın arkadaşlık ilişkilerinin bireyin mutlu olmasını yordayabileceğini ortaya koymuştur (Demir, Özen, Doğan, Bilyk ve Tyrell, 2011). Bu araştırma bulgusunu destekleyen bir başka çalışmada yine Froding ve Peterson (2012) arkadaşlık ile mutluluk arasında bir ilişki olduğunu ifade etmektedirler.…”

Using Aristotle’s theory of friendship to classify online friendships: a critical counterview

“…Similarly to the points made by Cocking et al (2012), Fröding and Peterson (2012) argue that the technological features available in online communication make it very easy for online users to have a great amount of control regarding the time, frequency and duration of interactions. To them, this is a problematic point because, ''they [the users] can (even unintentionally) choose to communicate only in certain situations.…”

“…Although McFall does acknowledge that many of the activities Aristotle mentions can now be shared online, he maintains that even so, these online friendships with shared activities can only be utility or pleasure friendships, since ''one thing that characterfriends provide for each other, an opportunity for robust moral reflection and improvement of the self and other, cannot be transferred as easily through technological means'' (p. 222). Fröding and Peterson (2012) subscribe to this view as well, by claiming that friendships of virtue cannot be sustained exclusively online and even the most intense kind of online relationship must always be paired with significant interaction offline. According to their analysis of the Aristotelian theory of the good life, a shared life between friends is superior and it is far better for the quality of the friendship if the two friends partake together in a plethora of activities.…”

“…Regarding the issue of conflating online friendships with the 'higher' form of friendship, Fröding and Peterson (2012) take an even more radical stand by comparing online friendship with certain controversial forms of alternative medicine: just like an alternative medicine can end up poisoning instead of healing, so can a person's online friendships lead him to disillusionment and isolation instead of providing him with robust and meaningful companionship. They compare and contrast the connections one makes through an online professional networking site to the relationships formed through social networking sites.…”

Beyond individual-centric privacy: Information technology in social systems

“…Thirdly, how the use of social networking services affects our social lives, for instance what they mean for the value of friendship or for values associated with self-presentation (Fröding and Peterson 2012;Rosen 2007;Vallor 2012), is also out of scope when the focus is on privacy. These topics do get some attention, but not as much as privacy.…”