Why voters who value democracy participate in democratic backsliding

Abstract

Around the world, citizens are voting away the democracies they claim to cherish. Why are they voting against their own values? In this article, we provide evidence that this behavior is driven in part by fear that their opponents might dismantle democracy first. In an observational study (N=1,973), we find that US partisans who most fear the other party's willingness to subvert democracy are also those most willing to support subverting democracy themselves. In an experimental study (N=2,543), we use an intervention to reduce these often exaggerated fears. With these fears reduced, partisans become more committed to upholding democratic norms. They also become more willing to vote against candidates of their own party who break these norms. The findings suggest that we can foster democratic stability by strengthening trust in opposing partisans' commitment to democracy.

Correcting misperceptions of the other political party does not robustly reduce support for undemocratic practices or partisan violence

“…Concern about the stability of American democracy has reached unprecedented levels ( 11 ). Theories of democratic norms ( 12 ) and partisan violence ( 3 ) point to the importance of what one partisan side believes about the other side. The worry is that partisans have vastly exaggerated perceptions of the opposing side.…”

“…see SI Appendix , page 15) (refs. 3 and 14 ; see SI Appendix for measurement discussion). SUP was measured with seven previously used items (e.g., support for ignoring rulings from other party judges; see SI Appendix , pages 19, 23) ( 5 ).…”

“…One notable factor concerns citizens’ acceptance of undemocratic practices and partisan violence, which provides elites with leeway to transgress ( 2 ). A burgeoning literature suggests that support for undemocratic practices (SUP) and support for partisan violence (SPV) stem in part from dramatically exaggerated perceptions that members of the other party strongly endorse such practices ( 3 , 4 ). Partisans’ own SUP and SPV significantly decrease once they learn of the other side’s lower levels of actual support ( 3 , 5 )—thereby constraining elite leeway.…”

“…For example, one study ( 3 ) shows that partisans overestimate the extent of SPV among those from the other party by roughly 300%. When they receive information about the actual lower level of support (e.g., 300% lower), their own SPV substantially drops.…”

How to study democratic backsliding

“…In the contemporary United States, partisans vastly misperceive outpartisans' antidemocratic attitudes and support for partisan violence. Braley et al (2023) find that partisans, on average, view members of the other side as being "probably" or "definitely" likely to violate more than 5 of 7 democratic norms (e.g., ignoring controversial court rulings by judges from the other party, reducing polling stations in towns that support the other party), even though the actual average is approximately 1.35 of 7 (across parties). Mernyk et al (2022) report that partisans overestimate the average amount of support for partisan violence by out-partisans by between 245% and 442%.…”