Why We Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching Definition of Empathy

Abstract

A growing cadre of influential scholars has converged on a circumscribed definition of empathy as restricted only to feeling the same emotion that one perceives another is feeling. We argue that this restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition is deeply problematic because (1) it deviates dramatically from traditional conceptualizations of empathy and unmoors the construct from generations of scientific research and clinical practice; (2) insistence on an isomorphic form undercuts much of the functional value of empathy from multiple perspectives of analysis; and (3) combining the opposing concepts of isomorphic matching and self-other awareness implicitly requires motivational content, causing the RIM definition to implicitly require the kind of non-matching emotional content that it explicitly seeks to exclude.

Comment: Getting Our Affect Together: Shared Representations as the Core of Empathy

“…Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark I welcome Murphy, Lilienfeld and Algoe's (2022) criticism of the restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition of empathy. I think that definition fails to get to the heart of what empathy is: that it, at least in its most basic version, has counterintuitive implications (is a person who feels murderous rage after observing another person feeling murderous rage empathic?…”

“… Empathy is a construct that is notoriously difficult to define. Murphy and colleagues (2022) argue for leaning into the construct's inherent fuzziness and reverting to what they term a classical definition informed by the observations of philosophers and clinicians: as a dynamic, “unfolding process of imaginatively experiencing the subjective consciousness of another person, sensing, understanding, and structuring the world as if one were that person.” Although consistent with some historical conceptualizations, this definition risks incorporating so many processes it would make empathy difficult to operationalize or distinguish from any generally socially sensitive interaction. Defining empathy instead as the attempted representation, or simulation, of another's subjective internal experiences (whether sensory, affective, or cognitive) would increase its clarity and empirical utility. …”

Comment: Empathy as a Flexible and Fundamentally Interpersonal Phenomenon: Comment on “Why We Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching Definition of Empathy”

“…Empathy is Functional and Relational Murphy, Lilienfeld, and Algoe (2022) provide a fascinating and thoughtful account of how restricting the definition of empathy to isomorphic matching (i.e., experiencing an identical emotion to another person) gravely misses the mark in progressing our understanding of the construct and its functional consequences. I wholeheartedly agree that empathy is best conceptualized as a flexible process that is more often cognitively effortful and dynamic than automatic and fleeting.…”

Comment: Debating Empathy: Historical Awareness and Conceptual Precision

“…I welcome Murphy, Lilienfeld and Algoe's (2022) criticism of the restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition of empathy. I think that definition fails to get to the heart of what empathy is: that it, at least in its most basic version, has counterintuitive implications (is a person who feels murderous rage after observing another person feeling murderous rage empathic?…”