Will I Regret It? Anticipated Negative Emotions Modulate Choices in Moral Dilemmas

Abstract

We tested if post-decisional emotions of regret, guilt, shame, anger, and disgust can account for individuals’ choices in moral dilemmas depicting the choice of letting some people die (non-utilitarian option) or sacrificing one person to save them (utilitarian option). We collected participants’ choices and post-decisional emotional ratings for each option using Footbridge-type dilemmas, in which the sacrifice of one person is the means to save more people, and Trolley-type dilemmas, in which the sacrifice is only a side effect. Moreover, we computed the EEG Readiness Potential to test if the neural activity related to the last phase of decision-making was related to the emotional conflict. Participants reported generally stronger emotions for the utilitarian as compared to the non-utilitarian options, with the exception of anger and regret, which in Trolley-type dilemmas were stronger for the non-utilitarian option. Moreover, participants tended to choose the option that minimized the intensity of negative emotions, irrespective of dilemma type. No significant relationship between emotions and the amplitude of the Readiness Potential emerged. It is possible that anticipated post-decisional emotions play a role in earlier stages of decision-making.

Interindividual neural differences in moral decision-making are mediated by alpha power and delta/theta phase coherence

“…Some, on the other hand, responded in a less consequential manner in that the ratio was larger. As other studies on Moral dilemmas show, the subjectively perceived emotional distress of the participant has a significant effect on their response 8,9 and reaction time 9 .…”

“…The subjectively perceived emotional distress scores were self-reported questions done after the EEG session which asked how distressing the participant found each scenario. Many studies have examined Moral dilemmas 8,9,22,34,62,63 and the LPP 27–32,43 related to emotion previously. Our intention was not to replicate emotion-related results, but rather look at the difference between participants on how they perceived their emotional distress related to interindividual differences at the neuronal level.…”

“…1B, Sup Table 1). Only Footbridge-type scenarios were chosen for the following reasons: they have been shown to increase relative brain activity in areas associated with emotional processing 17,18 and have elicited higher self-reported emotional intensities 8 when compared to the Trolley dilemma. Since previous studies have shown that emotion is involved in decision-making of consequential Moral dilemmas 8,9,63 , and our aim was to examine the interindividual thresholds related to these Moral dilemmas, the Footbridge scenario was used exclusively as varying the numbers of killed to saved was possible as a way of varying the consequences of the action taken.…”

“…Data was recorded at 1000 Hz. During analysis, all files were re-referenced to the average of the two (left, right) mastoids in accordance with previous studies with a similar number of electrodes 8,23,34,35,75 .…”

“…Much research has been done on the behavioral, psychological and neurophysiological responses to the iconic ‘Footbridge’ and ‘Trolley’ Moral dilemmas of Phillipa Foot 1,7,8,10,11,15,17–22 , though most of this is comprised of fMRI imaging. These studies have found that areas associated with emotional processing such as the medial frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate gyrus and the bilateral angular gyri are more active during Footbridge-like moral dilemmas than during Trolley-like dilemmas and non-moral dilemmas, while areas associated with working memory, such as the right middle frontal gyrus and the bilateral parietal lobes, are less active 17,18 .…”