Will to power? Intra-party conflict in social democratic parties and the choice for neoliberal policies in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain (1980–2010)

Abstract

Why do social democrats choose neoliberal labor market policies? Since social democrats are typically punished for welfare state retrenchment and because these policies do not equate well with social democratic egalitarian principles, it is difficult to see what they gain from it. We argue that, depending on the intra-party balance of power between activists and leaders, some parties are office-seeking, whereas others are policy-seeking. This behavioral difference explains why some parties are responsive to environmental incentives such as the economy and public opinion (office-seeking parties) and others are responsive to policy-motivated activists (policy-seeking parties). Using three case studies of social democratic parties (Germany, the Netherlands and Spain) in the period 1980–2010, we analyze when and why these parties introduced neoliberal reforms. The study shows that office-seeking parties introduce neoliberal measures if the risk of losing votes due to an underperforming economy becomes larger than the risk of losing votes due to the mobilization of unions and opposition parties. Policy-seeking social democrats retain a social democratic ideology, unless prolonged failure to win office empowers pragmatic leaders to push through office-seeking strategies.

Labour market disadvantage, political orientations and voting: how adverse labour market experiences translate into electoral behaviour

“…Under the leadership of Wim Kok in the 1990s, the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) developed a rather centrist policy orientation. This is expressed in openness to coalitions with the Liberal Party (VVD) and measures of welfare state retrenchment (Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002;Marx and Schumacher, 2013). We would therefore expect that the Labour Party is rather unpopular amongst individuals with labour market disadvantages.…”

Leadership Competition and Disagreement at Party National Congresses

“…51 Kitschelt 1989. 52 See, for example, Marx and Schumacher's (2013) analysis of intraparty conflict over policy rigidity and change in Social Democratic Parties in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. 53 Studies of economic voting (Lewis-Beck and Stegmair 2000), issue ownership Jennings 2012a, 2012b) and policy accountability (Carey 2009;Kam 2009) often emphasize parties' and leaders' policy reputations.…”

The Role of Competitive Advantage in Party Competition

“…They have a stronger hold over the party leadership if they are accorded more influence within the party organization. Research has shown that parties in which party activists have a tighter grip on the party leadership and policy formulation are less likely to compromise on their ideological stance whereas exclusive party organizations offer more leeway and flexibility to the party leadership (Lehrer ; Marx and Schumacher ; Meyer ; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis ). Altogether, a stronger role of interest groups and party activists vis‐à‐vis party leadership has important consequences for a party's strategic capacity.…”