WIN WIN's Struggles with the Institutional Transfer of the EMILY's List Model to Japan: The Role of Accountability and Policy

Abstract

This article addresses the complexities of institutional transfer by exploring the case of EMILY's List and WIN WIN, two women's organizations in the US and Japan respectively that seek to increase the number of women in office by providing funds early in candidates’ campaigns. Specifically, it asks why WIN WIN has struggled to successfully implement the EMILY's List model in Japan. This article argues that differing institutional environments and cultures have less explanatory power than decisions made at the organization level. In particular, while differences in the political funding regimes and so-called ‘cultures of giving’ exist, they do not necessarily preclude the success of an EMILY's List-type organization in Japan. Instead, WIN WIN made significant strategic organizational decisions that have impeded its ability to have a significant impact on female candidacy at the national level. Specifically, WIN WIN's lack of accountability to its members combined with its broader commitment to gender consciousness have limited its success.

Payments and Penalties for Democracy: Gendered Electoral Financing in Action Worldwide

“…Examples include, EMILY’s List in the US (Kreitzer and Osborn 2019) and the WIN WIN! initiative in Japan (Gaunder 2011). While the arena is clearly different for each approach, state-based versus society-based, whether a penalty or payment is used does not necessarily match a particular approach.…”

“…With respect to bottom-up approaches, Kayuni and Muriaas (2014) find in Malawi that campaigns directly targeting women can contribute to an increase in gender-balance if the context is conducive for change. Gaunder (2011) studying Japan and Bauer and Darkwah analyzing Ghana (2020) paint a bleaker picture. In Ghana, a reduced filing fee for women aspirants is not enough for women to make it to parliament.…”