Winner's curse and parallel sales channels—Online auctions linked within e-tail websites

Amyx, Douglas; Luehlfing, Michael S.

doi:10.1016/j.im.2006.08.010

Cited by 12 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Worse yet, consumers may experience ‘auction fever’ and get so caught up with winning the auction that they end up experiencing ‘winner's regret’ (Ku et al ., ; Peters & Bodkin, ), defined here as winning the auction but with the subjective emotional assessment of having overpaid for the item. Prior research on auctions has often referred to winner's regret as the winner's curse (Foreman & Murhighan, ; Amyx & Luehlfing, ; Malhotra, ; Adam et al ., ). In this paper, we use the term winner's regret rather than winner's curse because winner's curse usually implies that the winning bidder pays more than an auction item is worth.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Overpayment can be reduced by providing bidders with an easy means of checking the retail prices of goods. Based on a sample of 416 online auctions, Amyx & Luehlfing () found that only 8.7% of the winning bidders overpaid when they were using auction sites that provided links to websites that allowed bidders to check the reference price of identical retail merchandise available for sale at the same website.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Naturally, when a bidder believes that he or she has paid too much for an item of uncertain value (Ku et al ., ; Robert et al ., ), regret can occur. A rational explanation for such regret can be formulated based on three assumptions: (1) while the average bidder may accurately estimate the value of the item up for sale in an auction, some bidders will underestimate this value and others will overestimate it; (2) the bidder who most greatly overestimates the value of the item will typically win the auction; and (3) the amount of overestimation will often be greater than the difference between the winning bidder's estimate of the value of the item and what s/he ultimately had to bid in order to acquire it (Amyx & Luehlfing, ). Under this view, regret occurs as a result of uncertainty regarding an object's value, and thus, bidders can be economically rational and still suffer regret when their information is poor.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Empirical evidence suggests that regret can arise even when bidders have perfect information (Ariely & Simonson, ; Amyx & Luehlfing, ), and thus, the behaviour that leads up to this can be viewed as irrational. Oh () examined regret in consumer‐to‐consumer auctions and concluded that bidders do not necessarily behave in an economically rational way.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Winner's regret in online C2C Auctions: an automatic thinking perspective

Park

Keil

Bock

et al. 2015

Information Systems Journal

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While human beings embody a unique ability for planned behaviour, they also often act automatically. In this study, we draw on the automatic thinking perspective as a meta-theoretic lens to explain why online auction bidders succumb to both trait impulsiveness and sunk cost, ultimately leading them to experience winner's regret. Based on a survey of 301 online auction participants, we demonstrate that both trait impulsiveness as an emotional trigger and sunk cost as a cognitive trigger promote winner's regret. By grounding our research model in the automatic thinking view, we provide an alternative meta-theoretical lens from which to view online bidder behaviour, thus bolstering our current understanding of winner's regret. We also investigate the moderating effects of competition intensity on the relationships between the triggers of automatic thinking and winner's regret. Our results show that both trait impulsiveness and sunk cost have significant impacts on winner's regret. We also found that the relationship between these two triggers and winner's regret is moderated by competition intensity.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Winner's regret in online C2C Auctions: an automatic thinking perspective

Park

Keil

Bock

et al. 2015

Information Systems Journal

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“…Chen and Chou [5] show that bidders will defer choosing the "buy-it-now" option until the auction price is higher, when the number of bidders is common knowledge. Amyx and Luehlfing [6] study the impact of the "buy-it-now" option on the final auction price. Mathews [7] points out that the impact of the "buy-it-now" option on bidders' profit depends upon the distribution from which bidder valuations are drawn.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bidding strategy and participating threshold in online English auction with buy-it-now option

Gui-fen

2010

2010 IEEE 17Th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

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English auctions with a "buy-it-now" option are widely used in the Internet. This paper proposes a weakly dominant bidding strategy. It is optimal for bidders whose valuations are lower than the "buy-it-now" price to participate in the auction and bid their true valuations.Otherwise, bidders whose valuations are not lower than the "buy-it-now" price would make a choice between participating in the auction and pressing the "buy-it-now"button. It is optimal to bid the "buy-it-now" price if they decide to participate in the auction. We find that their decision on whether to participate in the auction or choose the "buy-it-now" significantly depends on the time remaining to the end of the auction.

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