With a Little Help from Our Feds: Understanding State Immigration Enforcement Policy Adoption in American Federalism

Abstract

Since 2001, state governments have adopted 287(g) cooperative immigration enforcement agreements with the federal government that authorize their law enforcement personnel to assist in detaining violators of civil federal immigration law. Employing a theoretical framework drawn from theories of policy adoption, intergovernmental relations, and immigration research, we test which state-level political, sociodemographic, geographic, and economic determinants influence states to enter into such a cooperative agreement. In addition to finding that the partisanship of a state's governor, a state's effort on public welfare, and an increase in a state's percentage of Hispanics are related to the adoption of a cooperative immigration enforcement policy, we found evidence of "steam valve federalism" working not at the state level as Spiro (1997) first theorized but at the local level. When a state's localities adopt immigration enforcement agreements with the federal government, the state itself is far less likely to adopt their own. Understanding the reasons states would adopt this type of policy sheds light on current trends in state immigration policy and their effect on future state/federal intergovernmental relations.

One Model Does Not Fit All: The Varied Politics of State Immigrant Policies, 2005–16

“…In explaining these diverging state approaches, existing research has trained its analytical focus on two explanations . The first explanation places immigrant policy within the context of ethnic/racial politics, where nativist perceptions of threat—incited by increased immigration—contend with the growing political clout of non‐Anglo immigrant communities (Avery, Fine & Marquez, ; Boushey & Ludtke, ; Creek & Yoder, ; Filindra, ; Filindra & Pearson‐Merkowitz, , ; Marquez & Schraufnagel, ; Newman, ; Ybarra, Sanchez, & Sanchez, ). The essence of this approach is captured by Boushey and Ludtke (), who argue that a larger “stock” of immigrants creates political pressures toward integrative policies, while an increased “flow” of new immigrants creates a countervailing pull toward restriction.…”

Deportation Discretion: Tiered Influence, Minority Threat, and “Secure Communities” Deportations

“…Studies have argued that demographics act as a source of racial threat, thus catalyzing restrictive policies, or as a source of political power, creating a buffer against such policies. The literature has come to competing conclusions regarding whether minority shares provoke (Avery, Fine, & Márquez, ) or prevent restrictionism (Newman, Johnston, Strickland, & Citrin, ); whether minority growth dampens (Creek & Yoder, ) or bolsters restrictionism (Hopkins, ; Monogan, ); or whether demographics matter at all (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, ). In order to reconcile these inconsistent findings, this paper asks: do policy actors in counties with a small concentration of minorities address immigration policy similarly to those in counties with above‐average concentrations?…”

Bringing Them “Out of the Shadows”: Analyzing the Movement to Reframe the Immigration Policy Narrative in Utah

“…This legislation sought to criminalize the illegal presence of immigrants and make it a crime for undocumented workers to seek work (Creek and Yoder 2012;Liptak 2012). It was an enforcement-only approach to what opponents of the legislation saw as highly punitive and both socially and economically detrimental to the state.…”

“…It was an enforcement-only approach to what opponents of the legislation saw as highly punitive and both socially and economically detrimental to the state. The provision requiring police to check the immigration status of someone they suspect is in the U.S. illegally, also known as the "Show Me Your Papers" provision, was left intact (Creek and Yoder 2012;Sherman 2012). Leaders in Utah reacted strongly to the passage of this legislation only months before the Utah legislature was scheduled to convene.…”