Wittgenstein on Self-Knowledge and Self-Expression

Jacobsen, Rockney

doi:10.2307/2956302

Cited by 62 publications

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“…The reader is referred to the well-known works of these authors for a detailed view of this philosophical trend. 7 This viewpoint is similar to that proposed by Wittgenstein who influenced this emotivist trend(Jacobsen, 1996). AsLoobuyck (2005, p. 384) notes: -In the Tractatus (6.41) Wittgenstein writes that ‗in the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen.…”

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confidence: 63%

Infusing Ethical Considerations in Knowledge Management Scholarship: Toward a Research Agenda

Chatterjee¹,

Sarker²

2013

JAIS

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The authors of this paper believe that scholarly work on knowledge management (KM) has largely overlooked ethical considerations. As such, this paper argues for the infusion of ethical considerations into knowledge management (KM) research. Using the lens of the classical ethical theories in philosophy, this paper revisits key areas of KM-knowledge creation, storage and access, transfer, and application-and generates relevant research questions in each of these areas. The paper highlights the importance of examining ethical issues related to KM, and offers an illustrative set of ethically-informed research themes and questions that can potentially be investigated by future studies.

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confidence: 63%

Infusing Ethical Considerations in Knowledge Management Scholarship: Toward a Research Agenda

Chatterjee¹,

Sarker²

2013

JAIS

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“…Jacobsen seems aware of this when he remarks that in contrast to the Cartesian, Rylean, and bifurcationist, the sceptic about mental representations reacts to the purported two-faced character of intentional states by declaring our ordinary concepts of intentional psychology unintelligible on the grounds that it is impossible for any contentbearing state to have both attributes. 14 Conversely, if the absence of an adequate explanation of first-person authority strikes us as providing a hotbed for other-minds scepticism, we shall be inclined to regard the difficulty as stemming from an incompatibility between the authority of intentional-state self-ascriptions and the possession on the part of intentional states of some kind of extrinsic or relational property, whether it be dispositional, causal, or functional. Since discovering such properties, whether in one's own case or in the case of others, requires observation of the subject's behaviour over a span of time, and since behavioural facts properly construed are, in principle, equally accessible to all mature cognitive agents, it is doubtful that dispositional ascriptions in general and intentional-state self-ascriptions in particular are specially authoritative.…”

Section: A Philosophical Problem About First-person Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The same holds when we self-ascribe by invoking the testimony of someone who interprets our behaviour or when we self-ascribe without specifying the content of the ascribed intentional state (e.g., "I believe the same as Derrida"). 20 Because of the caveats-normally self-ascriptions do not serve as selfdescriptions, but sometimes they do; usually their job is not to self-report, but sometimes it is-expressivism cannot be refuted by the following sorts of consideration: it is improbable that after we have inventoried the various expressive functions of self-ascriptions, it will turn out that no such utterances actually have a descriptive role, that none of them really count as fact-stating assertions about our own present intentional states; any progress in understanding self-other asymmetries that we have struggled to forge can only be hampered by an analysis that implies that we cannot think or talk about the very same matters that other persons do when they think or talk about what we believe or desire. 21 Minimalism is the view that the Disquotational Schema (henceforth DS), 〈 " p " is true if and only if p 〉 , tells us all there is about truth.…”

Section: Expressivism and Minimalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Authority of Expressive Self-Ascriptions

Nguyen

2008

Dialogue

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What explains first-person authority? What explains the presumption that an utterance is true when it is a sincere intelligible determinate first-person singular simple present-tense ascription of intentional state? According to Rockney Jacobsen, self-ascriptions each enjoy a presumption of truth because they are systematically reliable. They are systematically reliable because they are typically both truth-assessable and expressive. Such self-ascriptions, if sincere, are certain to be true. This article presents a defence and a critique of Jacobsen's theory. It is argued that the purported prevalence of expressive self-ascriptions is at best contingent. This contingency cannot explain why self-ascriptions are necessarily authoritative.RÉSUMÉ : Comment expliquer l'autorité de la première personne? Comment expliquer la présomption qu'un énoncé est vrai lorsque c'est une attribution d'un état intentionnel, sincère et intelligible, à la première personne du singulier de l'indicatif présent. Selon Rockney Jacobsen, les auto-attributions jouissent d'une présomption de vérité parce qu'elles sont systématiquement fiables. Elles sont systématiquement fiables parce qu'elles ont pour caractéristique d'être à la fois expressives et éva-luables en termes de vérité. Si de telles auto-attributions sont sincères, elles sont certainement vraies. Cet article présente une défense et une critique de la théorie de Jacobsen. L'auteur soutient que la prétendue prévalence des auto-attributions expressives est au mieux contingente. Cette contingence ne peut pas expliquer pourquoi il est nécessaire que les auto-attributions fassent autorité.

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“…A detailed analysis of how this kind of objections can be met can be found inJacobsen (1996) although in the context of defending expressivism, rather than constructivism. 28 See, for instance,Bar-On (2004), pp.…”

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confidence: 98%

Self-knowledge and commitments

Coliva

2008

Synthese

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In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes-called "commitments"-has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can't remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive account properly to explain authority, it has to take a rather dramatic constructivist turn, which makes it suitable as an explanation of self-knowledge only for a limited class of mental states.Crispin Wright 1 has been one of the first theorists to propose a so-called "constitutive" account of self-knowledge. 2 Constitutive accounts are particularly apt to explain knowledge of our own propositional attitudes. For it is a tenet of this kind of models that having knowledge of one's first-order mental states is (at least) a necessary condition for having those mental states. Arguably, however, this would make little sense for sensations and perceptions, as well as for some kind of emotions, which we are generally happy to grant to creatures such as infants and higher-order mammals whom, however, we think lack knowledge of their own mental states.

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Wittgenstein on Self-Knowledge and Self-Expression

Cited by 62 publications

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Infusing Ethical Considerations in Knowledge Management Scholarship: Toward a Research Agenda

Infusing Ethical Considerations in Knowledge Management Scholarship: Toward a Research Agenda

The Authority of Expressive Self-Ascriptions

Self-knowledge and commitments

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