Wokół Der Gedanke. Spór Russella z Fregem o naturę myśli, sądu i faktu

Abstract

This paper discusses various aspects of thought (der Gedanke) according to Frege. I analyze Frege's arguments that support key differences between thought and presentation (Vorstellung). On the other hand, I contrast Frege's standpoint with Russell's position. Frege's thought is the equivalent of Russell's proposition. However, there are vast differences between the elements that constitute thought and proposition. Consequently, there is a difference in the ontological status between the thoughtF (der Gedanke) and the propositionR. The relation between fact -that is, the true thought -and the True (das Wahre) is the crucial point here. Although there are numerous interpretations of Frege's view on this matter, it seems that all of them lead to serious difficulties. The considerations revolve around the following question: is Frege a consistent Platonist or a follower of the Kantian tradition?