“…This theory is typically linked to the conflict of interest result from the ownership separation (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The board diversity literature used it to explore topics such as board diversity influence on the agency conflict and performance of financial firms (Bektas & Kaymak, 2009; Boadi & Osarfo, 2019; Farag & Mallin, 2017; Ghosh, 2017; Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Kusi, Gyeke‐Dako, Agbloyor, & Darku, 2018; Shettima & Dzolkarnaini, 2018; Talavera, Yin, & Zhang, 2018), CSR reporting quality of financial sector (Tapver, Laidroo, & Gurvitš‐Suits, 2020), CSR practices (Isabel María García‐Sánchez, Martínez‐Ferrero, & García‐Meca, 2018), environmental, social, and governance performance (Birindelli, Dell'Atti, Iannuzzi, & Savioli, 2018), mergers and acquisition performance (Chu, Teng, & Lee, 2016; Hagendorff et al, 2007; Hagendorff & Keasey, 2012), risk taking (Abou‐El‐Sood, 2019; De Vita & Luo, 2018; Yu et al, 2017), compensation policy (García‐Meca, 2016), audit fees (Nehme & Jizi, 2018), earnings management (Fan, Jiang, Zhang, & Zhou, 2019), determinants of banks' bailouts (Fernandes, Farinha, Martins, & Mateus, 2016), and banks' efficiency (Ramly, Chan, Mustapha, & Sapiei, 2017). It is noteworthy that the agency argument helps us to understand the supervisory role of the board members to monitor and control management activities, whereas multiple theoretical perspectives enable us to better interpret the other roles of the board of directors.…”