Wondering what might be

Schulz, Moritz

doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9361-2

Cited by 4 publications

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“…As I pointed out earlier, the account presented in Schulz (2010) does not apply to modalised conditionals. For this reason, Willer provides an argument that a plausible extension of this view will not validate both inferences.…”

Section: Two Inference Patternsmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…The way Willer tries to reach this conclusion is a little more roundabout than one might initially expect, though. As a matter of fact, he does not directly argue against the account of epistemic modals presented in Schulz (2010). Rather, he focusses on modalised indicative conditionals such as (6) If John is not in Chicago, he must be in Boston.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…These include non-epistemic (or objective) theories of indicative conditionals as exemplified most prominently by the material analysis of the indicative conditional. Schulz (2010) explores the possibility that the theory of epistemic modals may be tied to the theory of indicative conditionals by a logical link between indicative conditionals and epistemic modals. There are two inference patterns which enjoy a considerable amount of intuitive plausibility.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…In his paper, Schulz (2010) describes how a theory of epistemic modals can be derived from the suppositional view of indicative conditionals by employing the two inference patterns above. Given any conditional '?…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Then he argues that the suppositional view combined with a derived view of epistemic modals as outlined by Schulz cannot explain the putative validity of these inferences. Unfortunately, modalised indicative conditionals are not discussed in Schulz (2010) at all. For this reason, Willer has to make an assumption about how the view presented by Schulz should be extended to such cases.…”

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Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer

Schulz

2011

Philos Stud

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A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367-386, 2010) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365-375, 2011) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer's argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and show that accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic necessitations.Keywords Indicative conditionals Á Epistemic modals Á Modalised conditionals Á Suppositional view Conditionals and epistemic modalsThe debates about conditionals and epistemic modals display various structural similarities. Positions of the same type have been advanced in both domains. There are contextualist theories of indicative conditionals and corresponding theories of epistemic modals. 1 More recently, there are also relativist theories of indicative conditionals supplementing the relativist theories of epistemic modals. 2 In the

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Section: Two Inference Patternsmentioning

confidence: 94%

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confidence: 99%

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Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer

Schulz

2011

Philos Stud

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Reporting Conditionals with Modals

Sztencel

Duffy

2018

Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy &Amp; Psychology

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Conditionals and modals work in tandem in some instances of practical reasoning, or decision making. Consider the following example (from Kratzer 2012): a. I want to become a mayor. b. (q) I will become a mayor only if (p) I go to the pub. c. Therefore, I should go to the pub. Given what the cogniser wants (a) and the relevant circumstances (b), the conclusion that the cogniser goes to the pub comes out as necessary. Hence, the presence of the necessity modal should in (c). Indeed, given the context of (a), the necessity modal in (c) is simply a reflection of the necessity of p for q, which is overtly represented by the use of the 'only if p, q' construction. This chapter looks into whether indirect reports of conditionals-in particular, indirect reports which involve the use of a modal verb-are sensitive to the necessity of p for q in cases where necessity is not overtly represented in a conditional, as in 'if p, q' formulations. We report on two online experiments into the relation between (i) perceived necessity or sufficiency of the truth of a conditional antecedent for the truth of the consequent, and (ii) the formulation of an indirect report of a conditional with necessity or possibility modals (have to, should, could). In Experiment 1, the 'necessity/sufficiency of p for q' variable was manipulated by contextually altering the number of alternative antecedents (e.g. Cummins et al. 1991; Thompson 1994; Politzer 2003). It was found that modals used in indirect reports of 'if p, q' conditionals co-vary with the number of alternative antecedents in predictable ways. This suggests that modals used in indirect reports of 'if p, q' conditionals may be a diagnostic for biconditional versus material interpretations of conditionals. The aim of Experiment 2 was to find out whether the results of Experiment 1 could be replicated in contexts which lower/eliminate the believability of the conditionals. It was found that manipulating the believability variable has no reliable effect on the results.

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An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning

Henning¹

2021

Synthese

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In a decision where much hangs on whether p, it would be irresponsible to simply guess that p and proceed. Thus, many people agree that there is an epistemic norm of practical reasoning: To justifiably rely on p in practical reasoning, one needs to be positioned well enough, epistemically, to do so.One much-discussed candidate norm is the Knowledge Norm. Two standard formulations: "One knows q iff q is an appropriate premise for one's practical reasoning." (Williamson 2005, 231) "Treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting only if you know that p." (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, 577) These formulations differ on a number of counts. The first, unlike the second, is a biconditional.When I speak of the Knowledge Norm here, I mean to refer to a conditional version, according to which knowledge is necessary in order for it to be proper to treat something as a practical reason.The formulations also differ in that one is about treating p as a premise in practical reasoning, the other about treating p as a reason for acting. I will assume that these pretty much come to the same thing. My own preferred formulation, by the way, will be about relying on p in practical reasoning. The Knowledge Norm is not the only candidate, though. Other proposals abound, like a Justified-Belief-that-One-Knows Norm (Neta 2009), a Justified-True-Belief Norm (Littlejohn 2009 and 2012), a Warrant Norm (Gerken 2011), or a Sensitive-Belief Norm (Enoch, Fisher and Spectre 2012). Also, there is the related debate about the norm of assertion. While it is not clear that both domains require a common norm, some norms from the latter debate might be proposed as practical norms, too. One candidate would be a Safe-Belief Norm (Pritchard 2014). Finally, there is the Truth Norm (defended for assertion in Weiner 2005). While maybe it should not be called an epistemic norm, it may come with a "secondary" norm which is epistemic. (More on this later.)This paper first criticizes all current proposals (except for the Truth Norm). It claims that they violate a plausible constraint that I label Transparency. I then propose an alternative epistemic norm. This norm captures much of the intuitive plausibility of other candidates, but it avoids the violation of Transparency. In this respect, it resembles the Truth Norm. Unlike the latter, however, 2 it is an epistemic norm in a narrow sense, and it does not count lucky guesses as proper on any level. The norm proposed contains, not a description of an epistemic condition of the reasoner or her evidence but an epistemic modal. It says: Rely on p in practical reasoning only if it must be that p. 1 Roadmap: § § 1 and 2 describe two problems for existing proposals, the problems of Negative Bootstrapping and of Level Confusions. § 3 offers a general diagnosis, tracing the two problems to a violation of Transparency. § 4 introduces the alternative norm. § 5 discusses Non-Factualism about epistemic modals. § 6 clarifies the proposal. And §7 adds to the proposal an associated norm of "secondary propriety", w...

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Wondering what might be

Cited by 4 publications

References 20 publications

Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer

Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer

Reporting Conditionals with Modals

An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning

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