Workers Are Working Harder: Effort and Shop‐floor Relations in the 1980s

Edwards, Paul; Whitston, Colin

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8543.1991.tb00373.x

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Empirical analysis of changes in work intensity has been analysed previously in the economics, sociology and the industrial relations literatures going back to Marx (see Roy, 1952;Guest, 1990;Edwards and Whitston, 1991;Fairris, 2002). Other empirical evidence confirms the hypothesis that outsourcing increases the level of work intensity (Ganley and Grahl, 1988;Haskel and Sanchis, 1995;Kessler et al, 1999).…”

Section: The Redistribution Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 76%

Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector‐outsourcing Contracts

Jensen

Stonecash

2005

Journal of Economic Surveys

126

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Outsourcing the provision of traditionally publicly provided services has become commonplace in most industrialized nations. Despite its prevalence, there still is no consensus in the academic literature on the magnitude (and determinants) of expected cost savings to the government, nor the sources of those savings. This article considers the arguments for (and against) outsourcing and then examines the empirical evidence pertaining to whether any observed savings occur and whether they persist over time. In addition, we examine the existing evidence for the 'redistribution hypothesis' and the 'quality-shading hypothesis', which critics have used to argue that outsourcing lowers government expenditure by lowering wages and conditions and/or lower quality services. Finally, we consider the impact of contract design on outsourcing outcomes. While the power of incentives is a strong theme in economics, recent work has suggested that high-powered incentives may be suboptimal for many public sector services, because they may crowd out intrinsic motivation, particularly in instances where agents are highly motivated. We discuss the implications of this insight for the efficiency of public sector outsourcing.

show abstract

Section: The Redistribution Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 76%

Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector‐outsourcing Contracts

Jensen

Stonecash

2005

Journal of Economic Surveys

126

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Subjective perceptions of recent effort change among survey respondents either in broadly representative surveys or in specialist surveys of employees in selected organizations or occupations (Edwards et al 1998; Edwards and Whitston 1991; Burchell et al 1999; Batstone and Gourlay 1986; IRS 1996)…”

Section: The Intensification Of Work Effort During the 1990s In Britmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense?

Green

2004

Industrial Relations

310

298

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractEffort-biased technological change and other explanations for work intensification are investigated. It is hypothesised that technological and organizational changes are one important source of work intensification and supportive evidence is found using establishment data for Britain in the 1990s. Work intensification has also been stimulated by the use of highcommitment human resource policies. A reduction in union power, and a rise in the use of temporary agency workers and contractors, were positively associated with work intensification; however, their impact during the 1990s was comparatively modest.JEL Classification: J22, J33 and J51.

show abstract

“…Empirical analysis of changes in work intensity have been analysed previously in the economics, sociology and the industrial relations literatures going back to Marx (see Roy, 1952;Edwards and Whitston, 1991;Guest, 1990;Fairris, 2002). Other empirical evidence confirms the hypothesis that outsourcing increases the level of work intensity (Ganley and Grahl, 1988;Haskel and Sanchis, 1995;Kessler, Coyle-Shapiro and Purcell, 1999).…”

Section: The Redistribution Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 74%

The Efficiency of Public Sector Outsourcing Contracts: A Literature Review

Jensen

Stonecash

2004

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Outsourcing the provision of traditionally publicly-provided services has become commonplace in most industrialized nations. Despite its prevalence, there still is no consensus in the academic literature on the magnitude (and determinants) of expected cost savings to the government, nor the sources of those savings. After articulating the differences between outsourcing and privatization, this article considers the arguments for (and against) outsourcing and then examines the empirical evidence pertaining to whether any observed savings occur and whether they persist over time. In addition, we examine the existing evidence for the "redistribution hypothesis" and the "quality-shading hypothesis", which critics have used to argue that outsourcing may result in lower government expenditure, but it does so by lowering wages and conditions for employees and lower quality services. Finally, we consider the impact of contract design on outsourcing outcomes. While the nature of the risk-incentive trade-off is well-known in the contract theory literature, some new empirical work has explored the application of this framework to outsourcing in order to understand the impact of the risk premium on outsourcing outcomes.

show abstract

Workers Are Working Harder: Effort and Shop‐floor Relations in the 1980s

Cited by 14 publications

References 6 publications

Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector‐outsourcing Contracts

Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector‐outsourcing Contracts

Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense?

The Efficiency of Public Sector Outsourcing Contracts: A Literature Review

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About