Working with the grain for reforming the public service: a live example from Sierra Leone

Abstract

Development practitioners still lack a critical mass of empirical evidence that can help identify the set of interventions that are most likely to work, and inform the design and implementation of feasible reforms. This article contributes to filling this gap by looking at the case of the ‘Sierra Leone Pay and Performance Project’, a World Bank-supported initiative to reform the civil service. It analyzes the functional problems characterizing the civil service and discusses what factors account for the observed dysfunctions. The central argument is that the current dysfunctions might be difficult to reverse as they define a sub-optimal equilibrium which serves political purposes ( dysfunctions by design). However, politics is not all that matters. This equilibrium is further reinforced by systemic dysfunctions that may not be the consequence of any strategic design or the outcome of elite preferences ( dysfunctions by default). This is where there is scope for change, even in the short run. Accordingly, the chances of successful civil service reforms are likely to be maximized if reform initiatives support modest and incremental changes that ‘work with the grain’ of existing incentives and are consistent with government preferences. The Sierra Leone Pay and Performance Project aims to do so by adopting a limited and targeted focus on pay reform, performance management and recruitment and staffing. In addition, the use of the results-based lending instrument is expected to help mitigate the current dysfunctions by aligning the incentives of the various players and, in this way, create the conditions for greater coordination across government agencies. Although the suggested approach is not without risks, recent dynamics suggest that the chances of success are greater today than in the past. Points for practitioners The article shows how project design can be improved by identifying the functional problems underlying civil service performance, with a special focus on the interests and purposes that they serve. Such ‘prospective’ political economy analysis can inform Bank efforts to (i) identify the context-appropriate and politically salient reform solutions; (ii) design the critical path for achieving these reform objectives; and, most importantly, (iii) select the appropriate lending instrument. The Sierra Leone example also suggests that results-based lending approaches are more amenable to ‘working with the grain’ and provide a promising way forward on public service reforms in difficult political environments.

Opting out of public sector employment: Gender and occupational aspirations among university graduates in Sierra Leone

“…Though respondents are attracted by the stability of public sector employment, several expressed an aversion to applying for vacancies due to perceived nepotistic recruitment over merit. This type of network-based recruitment transcends an information sharing/signalling role as in other studies (Abel et al, 2017;Carranza & Pimkina, 2018) and instead is indicative of patronage in public sector recruitment as other studies in Sierra Leone have highlighted (Harris, 2020;M'cleod & Ganson, 2018;Roseth & Srivastava, 2013;Srivastava & Larizza, 2013). This phenomenon has been argued…”

“…With respect to elected officials, women are under‐represented in the legislature as less than 20% of elected positions are held by women, though women make up 52% of the total population (USAID, 2019). Though, in principle, the civil service is independent from the legislature and appointments and promotions made by the Public Service Commission or Human Resource Management Office, the practice of patronage‐based and politically influenced appointments, promotions and remuneration has been well documented (Harris, 2020; M'cleod & Ganson, 2018; Roseth & Srivastava, 2013; Srivastava & Larizza, 2013). Such patronage in public sector employment has the potential to have gendered implications for labour market choices, and by extension outcomes, if patronage‐based recruitment affects males and females differently.…”

“…The public sector (including central government, local government, parastatals and state‐owned enterprises) employs 4.2% of all workers or 39% of estimated formal sector jobs (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2015, p. 25). The public sector has been described as having relatively few professional and technical staff at the middle and senior levels as over 87% of personnel were in the lowest (‘blue‐collar’) grades 1 to 5 in 2011 (Srivastava & Larizza, 2013, p. 462).…”

Incumbent bureaucrats: Why elections undermine civil service reform in Indonesia

“…In patronage democracies, a merit‐based bureaucracy is difficult to institute because politicians face strong incentives to develop and maintain tight control over the appointments and promotions of civil servants (Cruz & Keefer, ; Grindle, ; McCourt, Alarkoubi, & Bana, ). Studies on civil service reform increasingly highlight how the pervasiveness of clientelistic practices generates collective action problems that bedevil reform initiatives (Blunt, Turner, & Lindroth, ; Hodder, ; Nunberg & Taliercio, ; Srivastava & Larizza, ). These studies have in common that they all argue that knowledge about the informal, inner workings of politics is essential to develop more effective policies that can “work with the grain” (Booth, ) of prevalent incentive structures.…”

Governance Reform: Getting the Fit Right

“…Others are predators who seek to 12 For this point, see Grindle (2013). 13 For some examples of this approach in practice, see Srivastava and Larizza (2013) and Reid (2005). 14 Note that another approach to multi-stakeholder engagement, not a focus of the present article, is via strengthening the so-called "voice" chain in the long route of accountability through which citizens hold politicians to account.…”