2017
DOI: 10.1007/s11245-017-9466-8
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Would Moral Enhancement Limit Freedom?

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Cited by 7 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…However, as has been argued before, the line of argument appears unconvincing (see, e.g., Carter and Pritchard 2019;Danaher 2018;Diéguez and Véliz 2017;Savulescu et al 2014). Assume that John, a person like the old Kelly, improves himself.…”
Section: Neuroenhancement and Freedom To Fallmentioning
confidence: 88%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, as has been argued before, the line of argument appears unconvincing (see, e.g., Carter and Pritchard 2019;Danaher 2018;Diéguez and Véliz 2017;Savulescu et al 2014). Assume that John, a person like the old Kelly, improves himself.…”
Section: Neuroenhancement and Freedom To Fallmentioning
confidence: 88%
“…A central example is neurofeedback, in which a person regulates her brain function on the basis of real-time neuroscientific displays of her brain activity. Transcranial current stimulation of medial prefrontal cortex, for another instance, is reported to enable the replacement of impulsive unconscious attitudes with rationally controlled reactions in a way that employs the rational faculties of the individuals undergoing the intervention (see, e.g., Diéguez and Véliz 2017;Sellaro et al 2015). Assuming that these kind of techniques could be employed in connection with self-validating neuroenhancement, the view that such enhancement conflicts with autonomy because of the directness of the techniques it employs might not apply to all self-validating neuroenhancement.…”
Section: Is the Main Reason For Considering Self-validating Neuroenhamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They emphasize that conceiving of MBE as "amplifying the motivational power of certain moral reasons doesn't bypass the agent's deliberation and decision on the basis of these reasons" [25]. Further, Diéguez and Véliz have argued that "…alternative possibilities of action may be restored if the adduced loss is compensated with an improvement in sensitivity and lucidity that can lead to seeing new options and nuances…" [26]. In general, proponents of MBE who wish to challenge the claim that the freedom to fall is necessary for autonomy may point out that "a proper concept of free will does not have to include the freedom to act otherwise, also known as 'the principle of alternative possibilities" [26].…”
Section: Free Choicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, reducing freedom of options will not necessarily reduce an agent’s autonomy, especially when the agent does not value the options that are removed (or at least values other options equally or more) . If the state creates a law prohibiting people with eyesight of less than a certain quality from being airline pilots, and an agent does not meet the threshold, this does not necessarily mean that her choice of an alternative career as a doctor is less autonomous than it would have been had she had the option open to be an airline pilot.…”
Section: Negative Liberty Freedom Of Options and Autonomymentioning
confidence: 99%