X.509-Compliant Hybrid Certificates for the Post-Quantum Transition

Bindel, Nina; Braun, Johannes; Gladiator, Luca; Stöckert, Tobias; Wirth, Johannes

doi:10.21105/joss.01606

Cited by 11 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Post-quantum authentication in TLS is widely believed to be less urgent, as attacks against authentication cannot be mounted retroactively. However, several works also investigated the use of post-quantum signature schemes and certificates in TLS [5,6,44] by dropping in replacements of post-quantum primitives into the existing TLS 1.3 handshake and PKI infrastructure.…”

Section: Migrating To Post-quantum Tlsmentioning

confidence: 99%

More Efficient Post-quantum KEMTLS with Pre-distributed Public Keys

Schwabe

Stebila

Wiggers

2021

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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While server-only authentication with certificates is the most widely used mode of operation for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol on the world wide web, there are many applications where TLS is used in a different way or with different constraints. For example, embedded Internet-of-Things clients may have a server certificate preprogrammed and be highly constrained in terms of communication bandwidth or computation power. As post-quantum algorithms have a wider range of performance trade-offs, designs other than traditional "signedkey-exchange" may be worthwhile. The KEMTLS protocol, presented at ACM CCS 2020, uses key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) rather than signatures for authentication in the TLS 1.3 handshake, a benefit since most post-quantum KEMs are more efficient than PQ signatures. However, KEMTLS has some drawbacks, especially in the client authentication scenario which requires a full additional roundtrip.We explore how the situation changes with pre-distributed public keys, which may be viable in many scenarios, for example pre-installed public keys in apps, on embedded devices, cached public keys, or keys distributed out of band. Our variant of KEMTLS with pre-distributed keys, called KEMTLS-PDK, is more efficient in terms of both bandwidth and computation compared to post-quantum signed-KEM TLS (even cached public keys), and has a smaller trusted code base. When client authentication is used, KEMTLS-PDK is more bandwidth efficient than KEMTLS yet can complete client authentication in one fewer round trips, and has stronger authentication properties. Interestingly, using pre-distributed keys in KEMTLS-PDK changes the landscape on suitability of PQ algorithms: schemes where public keys are larger than ciphertexts/signatures (such as Classic McEliece and Rainbow) can be viable, and the differences between some lattice-based schemes is reduced. We also discuss how using pre-distributed public keys provides privacy benefits compared to pre-shared symmetric keys in TLS.

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Section: Migrating To Post-quantum Tlsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Combining a quantum random number generator and quantum-resistant algorithms into the GnuGPG open-source software

Raffaelli

Denman

Collins

et al. 2019

Advanced Optical Technologies

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The “quantum threat” to our current, convenient cryptographic algorithms is getting closer, with demonstrable progress by commercial quantum computing efforts. It is now more important than ever that we combine all of our tools into a new quantum-safe toolbox to develop the next generation of quantum-safe networking solutions. Here we combine an integrated quantum entropy source with quantum-resistant algorithms in the GnuGPG open-source software; leading to a fully quantum-safe version of GnuGPG. The quantum entropy source itself is capable of a raw rate of randomness in excess of 10 Gbps. After post-processing, quantum random numbers are used by the quantum-resistant algorithms to allow GnuGPG to perform its usual public-key cryptographic tasks, such as digitally signing documents, but now in a secure quantum-safe way.

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Towards Post-Quantum Security for Cyber-Physical Systems: Integrating PQC into Industrial M2M Communication

Paul

Scheible

2020

Computer Security – ESORICS 2020

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X.509-Compliant Hybrid Certificates for the Post-Quantum Transition

Cited by 11 publications

References 4 publications

More Efficient Post-quantum KEMTLS with Pre-distributed Public Keys

More Efficient Post-quantum KEMTLS with Pre-distributed Public Keys

Combining a quantum random number generator and quantum-resistant algorithms into the GnuGPG open-source software

Towards Post-Quantum Security for Cyber-Physical Systems: Integrating PQC into Industrial M2M Communication

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