Yardstick competition and partial coordination: Exploring the empirical distribution of local business tax rates

Buettner, Thiess; Schwerin, Axel von

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.013

Cited by 23 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Solé Ollé (2003), or they focus on intergovernmental and inter-regional relationship within a framework of fiscal federalism, e.g. Fossen et al (2017), Buettner and von Schwerin (2016), Gerard et al (2010) and Bordington et al (2004). Other scholars focus on an impact of yardstick competition on local prices; for instance, Klien (2015) who scrutinised the impact of tax policy on water prices in Austria.…”

Section: Statement Of the Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stimuli contributing to local property taxation – with the focus on spatial effects of industry and functional urban areas

Zdražil

Pernica

2021

Central European Journal of Public Policy

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In this study, we argue that a historical background of the region matters in tax mimicking and yardstick competition as a matter of principle. We seek to determine factors supporting the policy of the high local property tax in the Czech Republic. Based on the statistical and spatial data of 6,258 municipalities between 2009 and 2019, the results show that the municipalities burdened by large industrial facilities, as well as municipalities in the functional urban areas (FUAs), apply the policy of higher property taxation twice frequently than the rest. On the other hand, the industrial stimuli keep enfeebling after 2010, and the number of local governments preferring high property taxation is variegated across different FUAs. The causal analysis based on Granger's approach concludes an existence of cumulative effects of both industry and the FUAs, which push the municipalities with large industrial facilities located within an FUA to increase the property taxes. From the mimicking point of view, we found that mimicking policy is an important phenomenon among the municipalities of Czech Republic; however, it has different impacts on both stimuli (Industry and FUA). The analysis suggests that it rather incites the municipalities within the FUA to increase the local property taxes.

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Section: Statement Of the Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stimuli contributing to local property taxation – with the focus on spatial effects of industry and functional urban areas

Zdražil

Pernica

2021

Central European Journal of Public Policy

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“…Indeed, municipalitiesâ ȂŹ tax level can depend not only 8 There is a large literature which examines a range of factors influencing local tax rates e.g. Charney (1983), Ashworth and Heyndels (1997), Ross and Yinger (1999), Charlot and Paty (2007); Charlot, Paty, and Piguet (2015), Crowley and Sobel (2011), Baskaran (2014), Buettner and von Schwerin (2016). on its population size, income and subsidies received from the central government, but it can also depend on the level of amenities in the municipality.…”

Section: Empirical Applicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spatial Differencing for Sample Selection Models

Tchuente

Klein

2016

SSRN Journal

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“…By contrast, no interaction is found in jurisdictions whose mayors face a term limit. In a more recent study, relying on data about German States and local governments, Buettner and von Schwerin (2016) find empirical evidence of the existence of yardstick competition among sub-national jurisdictions in the choice of business tax rates.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric yardstick competition: traditional procurement versus public-private partnerships

Liddo

Vinella

2021

Ital Econ J

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We consider local jurisdictions where rent-seeking administrators undertake identical infrastructure projects, choosing between two contractual arrangements: traditional procurement (TP) and public-private partnership (PPP). A yardstick competition mechanism is triggered through retrospective voters’ electoral decisions. A regime with TP in one jurisdiction and PPP in the other is likely to arise when projects are mildly lucrative and/or jurisdictions have moderate fiscal capacity. In this equilibrium, incumbents provide different levels of public services, face different re-election probabilities, and obtain different rents. By differentiating the project governance, incumbents specialize in rent extraction over time, thus hindering yardstick competition although jurisdictions are otherwise identical.

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Yardstick competition and partial coordination: Exploring the empirical distribution of local business tax rates

Cited by 23 publications

References 35 publications

Stimuli contributing to local property taxation – with the focus on spatial effects of industry and functional urban areas

Stimuli contributing to local property taxation – with the focus on spatial effects of industry and functional urban areas

Spatial Differencing for Sample Selection Models

Asymmetric yardstick competition: traditional procurement versus public-private partnerships

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