2013
DOI: 10.1093/pa/gst004
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Yes, Minister: The Impact of Decision-making Rules on Geographically Targeted Particularistic Spending

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Cited by 12 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…A literature exists which suggests that the primary aim of an incumbent government is to get reelected, rather than maximise social welfare. Suiter and O'Malley (2013) argued that political parties will often target distributive spending on particular groups of voters. They argued that, depending on the type of electoral system and decision-making rules in place, such public spending can be important for the re-election of certain candidates or to help a party achieve or maintain a majority in parliament.…”
Section: Governmental Self-interestmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…A literature exists which suggests that the primary aim of an incumbent government is to get reelected, rather than maximise social welfare. Suiter and O'Malley (2013) argued that political parties will often target distributive spending on particular groups of voters. They argued that, depending on the type of electoral system and decision-making rules in place, such public spending can be important for the re-election of certain candidates or to help a party achieve or maintain a majority in parliament.…”
Section: Governmental Self-interestmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, Lindbeck (1987) theorised that expected returns are maximised by targeting swing voters, as core voters' choices are generally between voting for their own party or non-participation. More recently, Suiter and O'Malley (2013) suggested that only once factors such as decision-rules have been taken into account can we assess whether core or swing voters are the primary target of partisan spending. Due to this uncertainty, we construct an alternative model of governmental self-interest whereby the policy maker maximises the welfare weight on those most likely to vote, ignoring the distinction between core and swing voters.…”
Section: Governmental Self-interestmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…A politically influenced distribution of sport grants was also found in Ireland. Studies jointly mapping the period between 1999 and 2007 showed that districts that elected powerful ministers were awarded more resources compared to others (Considine, Crowley, Folley & O'Connor 2008, Suiter & O'Malley 2014.…”
Section: Theory Of Pork Barrel Politicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Ireland, private goods can only be delivered via the executive. In some areas at least, ministers had no compunction about using government money to distribute targeted benefits for political gain (Suiter and O'Malley, 2011). The cabinet also dominates the legislative process and ministers can target laws to benefit particular interests, as Ray Burke tried to do on behalf of Century Radio (Flood 2002a, 62).…”
Section: Costs and Benefits Of Business Financing Of Politics In Irelandmentioning
confidence: 99%