Yet Another “Epicurean” Argument

Finocchiaro, Peter; Sullivan, Meghan

doi:10.1111/phpe.12081

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…15. Some objections to the impossibility solution can be found in Finocchiaro and Sullivan (2016) and Johansson (2013).…”

Section: The Wish Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are, 2. Writings at least partly on Lucretius' Puzzle include Belshaw (2000), Brueckner and Fischer (1986;1993;, Deng (2015), Feldman (1991), Finocchiaro and Sullivan (2016), Harman (2011), Johansson (2013), Kamm (1993: Chapters 2-4), Kaufman (1995;1996;1999;, McMahan (2006), Meier (2019), Nagel (1979;1986: 223-31), Rosenbaum (1989), Sorensen (2013), and Timmerman (2018). I am gliding over a complication: Some of these writers treat Lucretius' Puzzle as the question whether it is the case that earlier-rather-than-later death can be bad for one but later-ratherthan-earlier creation cannot be bad for one.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Lucretian Puzzles

Rabenberg

2021

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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It seems that people typically prefer dying later to dying earlier. It also seems that people typically do not prefer having been created earlier to having been created later. Lucretius’ Puzzle is the question whether anything typically rationally recommends having a preference for dying later to dying earlier over having a preference for having been created earlier to having been created later. In this paper, I distinguish among three ways in which Lucretius’ Puzzle can be understood and say how I think they ought to be answered.

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“…15. Some objections to the impossibility solution can be found in Finocchiaro and Sullivan (2016) and Johansson (2013).…”

Section: The Wish Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lucretian Puzzles

Rabenberg

2021

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Future-bias and intuition shifts between moments and lifetimes

Nguyen

2022

Inquiry

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Death, Creation, and Future Bias

Rabenberg

2021

The Philosophical Quarterly

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A much discussed question in the philosophy of death is whether both of the following claims are true: (1) it is at least typically appropriate to prefer dying further in the future to dying less far in the future; and (2) it is at least typically appropriate not to prefer having been created further in the past to having been created less far in the past. Some philosophers have tried to defend (1) and (2) by appeal to the alleged appropriateness of future bias—roughly, greater concern for certain goods and bads in one's future than for certain goods and bads in one's past. I argue that such approaches to defending (1) and (2) probably cannot succeed, by arguing that even if a very strong version of future bias is appropriate, it does not follow that (1) and (2) are both true. Philosophers attracted to the conjunction of (1) and (2) ought to try to defend it by appeal to something other than future bias.

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Yet Another “Epicurean” Argument

Cited by 4 publications

References 25 publications

Lucretian Puzzles

Lucretian Puzzles

Future-bias and intuition shifts between moments and lifetimes

Death, Creation, and Future Bias

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